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For generations students of the American legal system who
have studied the history of the law of civil pleading and
procedure have devoted most of their attention to one single
incident-the enactment of the Field Code of Procedure in New
York in 1848. The interpretation advanced has been that prior to
the 1840's the common law system of pleading "taken from
England served well enough, and the people manifested little
inclination to take up the burden of revision." Instead they
"were too busily concerned with financial, social, and industrial
problems to permit of any great activity in the direction of
reforming legal procedure."' But, then, David Dudley Field with
the aid of a tiny band of lawyer-reformers, perceiving that the
common law rules of pleading were outmoded and unduly
expensive, conceived the Code and induced
the legislatures of
2
it.
adopt
to
states
other
most
and
New York
This story of Field and his Code has undoubtedly inspired
generations of practitioners with faith that thought and effort are
the chief ingredients of successful reform. A comprehensive
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON CODE PLEADING 3
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For discussions of the origins of the Field Code, see C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CODE PLEADING 17-19 (1928); R. FIELD & B. KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC
COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 313 (temp. 2d ed. 1968); J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY,
HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 3-4 (1969); E. SUNDERLAND, supra note 1, at 3;
Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisa4 in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 1
(1949); Hepburn, The HistoricalDevelopment of Code Pleadingin America and England,in 2
SELECT ESSAYS INANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 657 (1908).
The common law system continued in England throughout the first third of the 19th
century. While the demand for reform developed early in the century, the first actual
reforms were the Hilary Reforms of 1834. This series of reforms abolished the
technicalities in the commencement and the conclusion of pleas, simplified the form of
demurrer and joinder in demurrer, specified the scope of general issues in the different
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study of the surviving records of trial and appellate courts in
Massachusetts from 1760 to 1830 suggests, however, that the
traditional view of the impact of the Field Code may be
mistaken. At least in Massachusetts, the abandonment of the
system of common law pleading did not occur suddenly. Instead,
the common law system was gradually transformed during a
period of more than a half century into something like a modern
system of notice pleading. The transformation, moreover, was
largely the work of the courts and was not given statutory form
until it was nearly complete.
I. COMMON LAW PLEADING IN MASSACHUSETTS
BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
As early as the time of the American Revolution, lawyers
and laymen alike were aware of the needless expense of
litigation. One writer in 1770, for example, told a correspondent
that "[11 aw suits are what we wish to avoid and always advise our
friends against it, as tedious and very expensive... ,3In part, the
expense of litigation was a product of the fees paid to lawyers
and court officers. Although lawyers' fees were not high, court
fees were. Clerks', justices' and other fees due upon the
docketing of an action were higher, for example, than the fee
that a lawyer received for trying the action.4 Indeed, in hundreds
of cases the various court fees, all of which had to be paid by the
losing party, were greater than the sum which the plaintiff
recovered as damages. 5 Another element of expense arose from
forms of action, specified when several pleas could be used, and clarified when several
counts could be employed in the declaration. E. SUNDERLAND, supra note 1, at 3. The
effect of the reforms was minimal. One commentator has argued that the new rules
retarded the progress of reform by postponing the real reform of common law pleading
for another 20 years. C. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND 76-77 (1897). The major reforms of English pleading came with
the Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852, 1854 and 1860 and the Supreme Court of
Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, with the 1873 Act "sweep[ing] away the English
system of common law pleading even more completely than our codes have swept it
away." Hepburn, The HistoricalDevelopment of Code Pleading in America and England,in 2
680 (1908). SeeJ. KOFFLER & A.

SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
REPPY,
3 supra at 4.

Letter from Anderson Bannatyne & Co., Glasgow, toJohn Russell, Plymouth,June
5, 1770, in Plymouth Notary Public Records, 1768-1830 (mss. in Pilgrim Hall,
Plymouth,
Mass.).
4
Various costs of litigation are discussed in detail in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS
lxix-1xxii
(L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965) [hereinafter cited as LEGALPAPERS].
5
See, e.g., Freeman v. Bradbury, [June 1774] Cumb. Super. Ct. 226 (damages of 30s;
costs of L24 3s. 7d.); Reynolds v. Hall, [July 1766] Suff. Super. Ct. 20 (damages of L3 ls.
4d.; costs of L6 14s. 7d.); Bacon v. Nurse, [Sept. 17601 Worc. Super. Ct. 116 (damages of
L2 15s. 4d.; costs of L15 15s. 6d.).
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peculiar Massachusetts rules giving every litigant a right to have
his case tried twice. Thus, after he had lost his suit before a jury
in a county Court of Common Pleas, he had a right to a trial de
novo before another jury upon appeal to the provincial Superior
Court of Judicature. If the verdicts of the two juries were
inconsistent, he could obtain a third trial, again in the Superior6
Court, by bringing what was known as an action of review.
Multiple trials, of course, multiplied fees.
The final element contributing to the expense of litigation
was the system of common law pleading. The rules of pleading in
use in Massachusetts at the time of the Revolution were
outmoded and unduly technical. Although they may at one time
have functioned in a practical way, rules dealing with matters
such as the forms of action, service of process, joinder and
identification of parties, and other procedural niceties had ceased
to do so by the second half of the eighteenth century. These
complex and technical rules did, however, introduce wasteful
expense into the litigation process
by producing needless
7
dismissals and reinstitutions of suits.
The common law forms of action were in full vigor in preRevolutionary Massachusetts, except in actions to try title to
land. All of the actions commonly in use in England, such as
trespass, trover, case, debt, covenant, assumpsit and replevin
were also in use in Massachusetts, and one even finds obscure
actions, such as recout, in occasional use.8 Under the common
law system of pleading a plaintiff was required to name the form
of action under which he was bringing his suit. If he did "not
name ... his plea," 9 "give ... any name to this his Action," 10 or
"declare ... in an action of Debt or Trespass on the Case, or in
any other Action or Plea known in the Register or in the Law,""
6

The jurisdiction and practice of the courts in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts,
including the rights of litigants to take appeals, are discussed in 1 LEGAL PAPERS, supra
note 4, at xxxviii-xliv.
7
Writs that were technically insufficient were abated, but abatement normally did not
bar reinstitution of a suit by the filing of a new and technically sufficient writ. See id xlv.
See also Lovell v. Doble, Quincy 88 (1763).
8
Reed v. Riddan, [Dec. 17611 Essex C.P. 93. Some writs, however, served different
functions in Massachusetts than they had served in England. For example, entry, which
had become obsolete in 18th-century England, seeT. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 373 (5th ed. 1956), became in Massachusetts an all-purpose writ in
the nature of case for the recovery of land. SeeA. STEARNS,A SUMMARY OF THELAW AND
PRACTICE OF REAL ACTIONS 507-08 (1824). Replevin, which lay in England only for
wrongful distress, see T. PLUCKNETT, supra, at 368, had become a general writ for
litigating property in chattels. See Scott v. Tirrell, [Aug. 1773] Suff. Super. Ct. 104;
Sixley v. Brown, [Sept. 17671 Berk. C.P. 428.
9
Watson v. Bliss, [Dec. 17641 Bris. C.P. 207.
10
Atkins v. Roby, [Jan. 1767] Suff. C.P. Files.
" 'Hunt v. Fay, [Nov. 1771] Msex. C.P. Files.
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his writ would be abated. Writs were also abated when a plaintiff
brought the wrong cause of action-trespass, for example,
12
instead of case, for obstructing the flow of water to a mill dam;
case, instead of debt, on a bond;13 debt, instead of trespass, for a
statutory penalty for cutting the plaintiff's trees; 4 debet and
detinet, a variety of debt, instead of detinet only, on an
administrator's bond. 15

Each form of action, moreover, had its own appropriate
form of general denial, so called because it imported an absolute
and complete denial by a defendant of each and every allegation
in a plaintiff's declaration. For example, in trespass, either vi et
armisor on the case, the appropriate form of general denial was
not guilty; in debt, owes nothing; in debt on a bond, it is not the
defendant's deed; in assumpsit, never promised. If the defendant
pleaded the wrong general issue, as, for example, not guilty to a
plea of assumpsit or owes nothing to a plea of trespass, or if the
defendant pleaded a sham issue, such as that he had no money,
that he was a Son of Liberty and therefore ought not be sued 16 or,
as John Adams colorfully pleaded in two cases, "Law is perfect
reason without passion," 17 and "the Law of nature is common to
brutes & men,"18 then judgment would be given upon demurrer
for the plaintiff. Of course, lawyers had little difficulty in
pleading the correct general issue, since the relevant rules of law
were clear and simple. However, in the Court of Common Pleas
they often pleaded the wrong general issue in order to secure a
judgment from which they could appeal to the Superior Court
without having to go through the mechanism of a full trial.19
If a defendant did not wish to plead the general issue, he
could plead specially. Although special pleading was used only
rarely before the Revolution, its use became more frequent
thereafter. 20 Special pleas could be of a great variety, depending
upon the circumstances of a defendant's case. A defendant might
12 SeeSawyer v. Farnham, [June 1765] Essex Super. Ct. 187.
13 SeeBush v. Fellows, [Nov. 1771] Berk. C.P. 433.
14 See Owen v. Lee, [Aug. 1761] Hamp. C.P. 237.
15 SeeRoss v. Willson, [Sept. 1766] Berk. C.P. 362; Fonda v. Lee, [Apr. 1765] Berk.
C.P. 639, rev'd on default, [Sept. 1765] Hamp. Super. Ct. 285. See also Bicknall v. Draper,
[Oct. 176 11 Bris. Super. Ct. 269 (abated for calling writ "plea of review of plea of debt,"
instead of "plea of review of plea of review of plea of debt").
l"SeeBoyce v. Spear, [Dec. 1766] Ply. C.P. 226.
"Clap v. Stockbridge, [Apr. 17681 Ply. C.P. 376.
18Barker v. Elmes, [Apr. 1768] Ply. C.P. 376.
19 Seegenerally 1 LEGALPAPERS, supra note 4, at xlvi.
20
The absence of special pleading in the pre-Revolutionary period, noted in 1 LEGAL
PAPERS, supra note 4, at 28-29, has been confirmed by the present author's research. For
one of the rare examples in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts of special pleading beyond
the replication, see T. PARSONS, PRECEDENTS No. 71 (mss. in Harvard Law School
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plead an accord and satisfaction, arbitration, conditions performed,21 infancy or some other fact which precluded the
plaintiff from maintaining his action. 22 He could also put in a
plea in justification, as, in actions of assault and battery, selfdefense or defense of freehold; 23 in trespass, that the defendant
did the act complained of by virtue of some office which
warranted him to do it; or, in an action of slander, that the
plaintiff really was as bad a man as the defendant said he was.
Finally, a defendant might plead the statute of limitations or
some other statutory defense.24
The response to a special plea by a defendant was a
replication by the plaintiff, traversing or confessing and avoiding
the special plea. That could be followed by a rejoinder by the
defendant, followed, in turn, by a surrejoinder, a rebutter, and a
surrebutter 25 A number of technical rules made special pleading
a very refined and difficult art. First, a plea was required to be
single-that is, to contain only one factual allegation; moreover,
a party could set forth only one plea, unless he obtained the
court's permission to plead double. Second, a party's plea had to
answer his opponent's allegations in every material point. A plea
also had to be direct, positive and nonargumentative, certain as
to time, place and persons, capable of trial, and properly averred
in the common form-"and this he is ready to verify."26 A final
rule was that the defendant could not put in a special plea which
amounted merely to a denial of all or part of the plaintiff's.
charge, but had to advance some new fact not mentioned in the
declaration. In a writ of assumpsit, for example, where a plaintiff
alleged nonpayment or nonperformance by the defendant as one
of several essential parts of his cause of action, the defendant
could not, in turn, plead payment or performance, 27 for that plea
Library, Cambridge, Mass.). For examples of special pleading during the first decade
after the Revolution, see Trear v. Bacon, [Oct. 1788] Berk. SJ.C. 16; Murray v. Farley,
[Nov. 1787] Essex SJ.C. 302; Allen v. Bruce, [May 17871 Worc. SJ.C. 96; Clark v.
Holmes, [Nov. 17861 Msex. SJ.C. 424; Sexton v. Parker, [Nov. 17851 Hamp. S.J.C.
161; Commonwealth v. Raymond, [Apr. 1785] Msex. SJ.C. 78; Commonwealth v. Otis,
[Mar.
1785] Suff. SJ.C. 1; Peters v. Wilkins, [June 1783] Essex SJ.C. 115.
21
SeeSacket v. Sacket, [Nov. 1771] Hamp. C.P. 106.
22
SeeProuty v. Bryant, [Dec. 17691 Ply. C.P. 25 (plea in debt on administration bond
that arbitrators made no award); Phelps v. Cotton, [Aug. 1762] Hamp. C.P. 7 (plea that
defendant
never warranted primary obligor's ability to pay).
23
See Allen v. Spooner, [June 17721 Worc. C.P. 397, appeal dismisse, [May 1773]
Worc.
2 4 Super. Ct. 33.
See generally3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *306-13.
2
Id*309-10.
26
Id *308.
27
See Lapham v. Corving, [July 1766] Ply. C.P. 193; Hyland v. Clap, [July 1763]
Ply. C.P. 378; Partridge v. Hinds, [May 17611 Hamp. C.P. 209. Cf Stiles v. Leete, [Nov.
1764] Hamp. C.P. 26 (plea that defendant never signed note rejected).
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merely denied an element in the plaintiff's claim and advanced
no new fact. The defendant could, however, plead payment by
some specified means,2 8 or performance of his contract in some
other specific manner, 29 for such pleas would add new facts and
not merely negate facts already pleaded by the plaintiff.
It was only in cases involving title to land that the rules of
common law pleading had been somewhat modified by the time
of the Revolution. Although the court records contain occasional
references even to such obscure writs as novel disseisin, 3° the
ancient English actions such as entry, ejectment, formedon and
others had, in general, been embraced in colonial Massachusetts
within a single generic form of action variously called a plea of
ejectment, a plea of entry, or, more simply and more frequently,
a plea of land, which avoided ancient technicalities and resulted
in a trial like that in any other civil suit. 31 In a plea of land, a
plaintiff was required to allege the nature of the estate of which
either he or the person through whom he claimed the land had
been seised 32 within thirty years prior to the commencement of
his suit. 33 The proper general denial was that the defendant was
not guilty or that he did not disseize the plaintiff. If a defendant
entered an erroneous plea, such as never promised, judgment
would be entered for the plaintiff. A defendant also had the
option of pleading specially.
In addition to the generic plea of land, the only other writ in
frequent use in litigating title to real property was the writ of
28
2

See Crowfoot v. Percey, [Sept. 1763] Berk. C.P. 265.

1SeeTalmadge v. Strong, [Sept. 1769] Berk. C.P. 299, appeal dismissed, [Sept. 17691

Ham. Super. Ct. 144.
See Ingersoll v. Sikes, [Sept. 1762] Etamp. Super. Ct. 417 (mention made of prior
writ of novel disseisin).
"3 2tSeeA. STEARNS, supra note 8, at 507-08; 1 LEGALPAPERS, supra note 4, at 261.
SeeStoddard v. Goodrich, [Apr. 17731 Hamp. Super. Ct. 39; Hills v. Brown, [Oct.
1771] Bris. Super. Ct. 166; Wilson v. Linton, [Oct. 17661 Bris. Super. Ct 148; Rochester
Proprietors v. Hammond, Quincy 154 (1765); Ruggles v. Barrows, [May 1764] Ply.
Super. Ct. 238. Bare title in the plaintiff was insufficient to make out an allegation of
seisin. A plaintiff also had to allege that he was in possession of the land, see Powers v.
Powers, [Dec. 17761 Worc. C.P. 457 (abated for failure to allege possession in addition to
bare title), or that he was taking the profits thereof. See Moor v. Spencer, [Feb. 1769]
Berk. C.P. 270 (writ abated for failure to allege taking of profits). See also Spaulding v.
Green, [Oct. 17711 Msex. Super. Ct. 183 (writ containing allegation of taking profits).
Not all writs, however, contained this allegation. See Warren v. Apthorp, [Feb. 1772]
Suff. Super. Ct. 4.
33
0n the 30-year limitation period, see Stoddard v. Goodrich, [Apr. 17731 Hamp.
Super. Ct. 39; Lindale v. Cudworth, [Sept. 1760] Bris. C.P. 410. In addition to his
allegation of seisin, a plaintiff also had to describe by metes and bounds the close to which
title was being litigated. See Rochester Proprietors v. Hammond, Quincy 159 (1765);
Ruggles v. Barrows, [May 1764] Ply. Super. Ct. 238; French v. Cobb, (Bris. Super. Ct.
1763), in 1 R. PAINE, MINUTES OF TRIALS &LAw CASES (mss. in Mass. Hist. Soc., Boston,
Mass.); King v. Averill, [Sept. 1767] Berk. C.P. 560.

COMMON LAW PLEADING REFORM

trespass quare clausum fregit 34 As in the plea of land, a plaintiff in
trespass had to allege that the land in question was "the plaintiff's
close," 35 an allegation which superficially resembled the allegation of seisin in a plea of land. However, the allegation that the
land was the plaintiff's close, unlike the allegation of seisin, did
not, upon a defensive plea of the general issue, put seisin in issue.
That is, if a defendant pleaded the general issue of not guilty, a
judgment upon a writ of trespass would not determine seisin of
the land and would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit
between the same parties for that land. A defendant could,
however, put seisin in issue, if he wished, by pleading, in lieu of
the general issue, that the land was "his own proper soil and
freehold." A judgment upon that plea would have an effect
similar to the effect of a judgment upon the generic plea of land.
34

1n addition to trespass quare clausumfregi, trespass was frequently used in 2 other
forms in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts - trespass to the person and trespass de bonis
asportatis.Trespass to the person lay for assaults, see King v. Stewart (1773-1774), in 1
LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at 106; Gray v. Pitts (1771), in id 157; Gill v. Mein
(1768-1769), in id 151; for wrongfully imprisoning the plaintiff "against the Custom of
England and this province," Hendricks v. Ashley, [Sept. 1772] Hamp. Super. Ct. 139,
even if the imprisonment occurred pursuant to legal process, see Martin v. Welch, [Aug.
1763] Suff. Super. Ct. 112; Perkins v. White, [Nov. 1767] Hamp. C.P. 207; and for
having sexual intercourse with the plaintiff's wife. See Dougherty v. Little, [May 17681
Msex. Super. Ct. 163; Staple v. Hammet, [June 17631 York Super. Ct. 70. Cf Fairbanks
v. Morey, [June 1760] Bris. C.P. 374, affd, [Oct. 1761] Bris. Super. Ct. 265 (abduction of
plaintiff's wife, but no allegation of intercourse). Trespass de bonis asportatislayfor taking
money, seeBurham v. Mugford (1770-1771), in 1 LEGALPAPERS, supranote 4, at 149, or
valuable documents belonging to the plaintiff, see Bradford v. Crowningshield, [June
1763] Essex Super. Ct. 59; for taking or wounding the plaintiff's animals, see Wise v.
Hight, [June 1767] York Super. Ct. 278; Wentworth v. Willum, [July 1765] York Super.
Ct. 216; for taking the plaintiff's ship, see Bailey v. Williams, [June 1769] Cumb. Super.
Ct. 83; Treat v. Preble, [Oct. 1764] Bris. Super. Ct. 107, modified [Aug. 17651 Suff.
Super. Ct. 230; and for destoying the plaintiff's fishing net, see Buck v. Runnels, [Oct.
1763] Essex Super. Ct. 200. In order to bring any writ of trespass, a plaintiff had to prove
that the defendant's use of "force and arms," Briggs v. Foster, [Mar. 17731 Bris. C.P. 10,
was "against the peace of his Present Majesty." Ingersoll v.Johns, [Sept. 17691 Berk. C.P.
398. It was not, however, necessary for the plaintiff to prove any actual injury in order to
recover damages. Cf Gibbs v. Higgins, [Aug. 1763] Hamp. C.P. 134 (sustaining
declaration which set forth injuries only by way of recital instead of by positive
averment). He could recover merely for being "robb'd and deprived of that peace,
Satisfaction & Security [to] which every one of the liege Subjects had a right &c.",
Howell v. Pearson, [June 1767] Cumb. Super. Ct. 270, and for his "disgrace." Tyng v.
Henshaw, [Aug. 1761] Suff. Super. Ct 299. Accord, Martin v. Welch, [Aug. 17631 Suff.
Super. Ct. 112. A plaintiff could also recover in trespass for consequential, as
distinguished from immediate, damages; damages were awarded, for example, for loss of
wages due to injuries sustained from an assault, see Spooner v. Allen, [Apr. 1773] Wore.
Super. Ct. 33; for the loss of a lawsuit as a result of the defendant's theft of the plaintiff's
documents, seeBradford v. Crowingshield, [June 1763] Essex Super. Ct. 59; or for profits
from a voyage lost as a result of the defendant's wrongful seizure of the plaintiff's ship. See
Bailey v. Williams, [June 1769] Cumb. Super. Ct. 83; Treat v. Preble, [Oct. 1764] Bris.
Super. Ct. 107, modified, [Aug. 1765] Suff. Super. Ct. 230; Winslow v. Capen, [Aug.
1762] Suff. Super. Ct. 391.
35_7ohn A dams' Pleadings Book, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at 84-85; T. PARSONS,
PRECEDENTS No. 71 (mss. in Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Mass.). As in the
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It would determine who was seised of the land,36 although a
plaintiff in trespass could recover only damages for interference
with his seisin and not, as in a plea of land, the land itself.37
After a plaintiff had selected the correct writ, he was
required to have it served on the defendant. Service in a civil
action could be accomplished at the plaintiff's option either by a
summons or by a capias, or, under special circumstances, by
other means ordered by the court.3" When a summons was used,
a proper officer was simply commanded to summon the
defendant, if found within his precinct, to appear at a specified
term of the Court of Common Pleas for the appropriate
county.39 In the case of a capias, the officer was directed to attach
the goods or estate of the defendant
and for want thereof to take
40
his body, if found in his precinct.
plea of land, a plaintiff in trespass also had to describe the close by metes and bounds. See
Fowle v. Wyman, Quincy 336 (1773); Foster v. Bradford, [Dec. 1767] Ply. C.P. 355;
Sartell v. Parkhurst, [Apr. 1765] Msex. Super. Ct. 159; Bagley v. Ring, [July 17631 Essex
C.P. 250. See also Ingersoll v. Hamlin, [Sept. 1769] Berk. C.P. 400 (writ abated for
alleging
36 that trespass occurred at 2 different places).
SeeJordan v. Miller, [June 1772] Cumb. Super. Ct. 156; Bowdoin v. Branch, [June
1770] Cumb. Super. Ct. 128; Bowdoin v. Springer, [June 1769] Cumb. Super. Ct. 87;
Case37v. Ingersoll, [Apr. 1764] Berk. C.P. 367.
The execution that issued upon a writ of trespass to which a defendant had pleaded
proper soil and freehold gave only money damages and did not put the plaintiff back in
seisin of the land. See cases cited note 36 supra.
38
See Bryant v. Inhabitants of Chesterfield, [Nov. 1768] Hamp. G.S. 104. A plaintiff
could elect the means by which he wanted process served, but once he had made his
election, service had to be by that means. A suit commenced by a capias, for example,
would be dismissed if the officer making the service could find neither the defendant's
estate nor his body, seeRogers v. Whitehand, [Dec. 1764] Essex C.P. 428, or if, instead of
arresting the defendant, the officer merely summoned him and took security for his
appearance. SeeMansis v. Butters, [Dec. 1771] Essex C.P. Files. Cf Barnes v. Greenleaf,
Quincy 41 (1763). Service by capias was also insufficient if the officer attached real
instead of personal property. See Sargent v. Bishop, [Dec. 1768] Essex C.P. Files. An
action against an executor could not, of course, be commenced by a capias directing
attachment of the fiduciary's personal estate or body. See Sprague v. Wing, [Oct. 1769]
Ply. C.P. 15. Service by summons, on the other hand, would be defective if the summons
itself were defective in that it failed to state the plaintiffs cause of action, see Gilbert v.
Ulitt, [Oct. 1763] Worc. C.P. 213; Newcomb v. Newland, [June 1763] Bris. C.P. 59; and
the amount of damages demanded, see Gilbert v. Ulitt, [Oct. 1763] Worc. C.P. 213; or in
that it was not duly authenticated by the court. See Cheney v. Child, [Oct. 1763] Worc.
C.P. 210. A misnomer, however, would not invalidate a summons. See Ingales v. Hill,
[Sept. 1764] Bris. C.P. 154, appealdismissed, [Oct. 1764] Bris. Super. Ct. 64. Service by
summons would also be defective if a valid summons were not properly served. Proper
service required that the summons be left with the defendant at his residence or last usual
place of abode. See Story v. Sawyer, [Mar. 1769] Essex C.P. Files; Page v. Nurse, [May
1763] Worc. C.P. 127. It was not sufficient for the officer merely to read the summons to
the defendant. See Robinson v. Geyer, [Oct. 1772] Suff. C.P. Files; Stow v. Wyman, [May
1770] Msex. C.P. Files.
39
See, e.g., Potamia v. Gould, [Nov. 1767] Msex. C.P. Files; Boucher v. Stearns, [Dec.
1760] Msex. C.P. Files; John Adams' PleadingsBook in 1 LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at
34, 36,
40 37, 42, 43, 51, 58, 60, 62, 65, 80.
SeeHedden v. Noyes, [Sept. 1770] Essex C.P. Files; Farrow v. Wilson, [May 1765]
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Three basic rules regulated the service of all process, both
summons and capias. First, process was required to be served by
an officer.4 Second, the writ had to be served by the particular
officer to whom it was directed.42 Finally, service on a defendant
had to be accomplished at least fourteen days before the court
sat4" and had to notify the defendant of the time at which court
would meet."
A plaintiff also had to be certain that all parties who ought to
Msex. C.P. Files; John Adams' PleadingsBook, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at 39, 41,
45,47,48-49,55,59,63, 68,79,81, 84,85. An officer could not be commanded to attach
goods without also being commanded to take the defendant's body if no goods could be
found. See Eaton v. Hart, [Mar. 1766] Essex C.P. 554. A thorough examination of John
Adams'PleadingsBook, in I LEGAL PAPERS, supranote 4, at 31-86 and the pleadings book of
Theophilus Parsons, mss. in Harvard Law School Library, Cambridge, Mass., reveals
that a plaintiff's attorney had the option of using a summons or a capias in all writs. See
[16991 Mass. Laws, ch. 2. See alsoHanlon v. Thayer, Quincy 99 n.2 (1764). Of 23 actions
of debt recorded in the books, for example, 12 were begun by a capias and 11 by a
summons; of 63 actions of case, 51 by capias and 12 by summons; of 10 actions of
trespass, 6 by capias and 4 by summons; and of 23 actions for the recovery of land, I by
capias and 22 by summons. All 7 writs of covenant in the Parsons book were begun by
capias, while the 3 actions of account in the 2 books were begun by summons. In actions
of case, one can find, in addition to practice by the bar, judicial statements and holdings
sanctioning service either by attachment alone, see Barlett v. Kennedy, [Mar. 17671 Essex
C.P. 82 (overruling plea that service by summons without attachment defective), or by
summons alone. See Leonard v. Stetson, [May 17651 Ply. Super. Ct. 34 (overruling plea
that service by attachment without summons defective); Blanchard v. Torney, [Dec.
17651 Msex. C.P. 115 (noting that service upon defaulting defendant was of the sort
"where Estate only was attached").
41
See Holden v. Holman, [Sept. 1762] Berk. C.P. 132. Usually that officer was a
sheriff or his deputy, but in suits under 10 pounds, a plaintiff could direct that service be
made by a town constable instead. See Bragg v. Norwood, [Mar. 17711 Essex C.P. 94;
Barry v. Mason, [Sept. 17701 Bris. C.P. 274, affd, [Oct. 1770] Bris. Super. Ct. 199; Dike
v. Alexander, [Sept. 17661 Essex C.P. 30, rev'd on default [Nov. 17661 Essex Super. Ct.
178; Brewer v. Brown, [Feb. 17641 Worc. C.P. 294. If a sheriff or deputy was party to a
suit, service was required to be made by a constable, but see Dewey v. Sackett, [Apr. 17621
Berk. C.P. 99, or, if the suit was for more than 10 pounds, by a county coroner. See
Nickols v. Wait, [Sept. 1764] Worc. Super. Ct. 6; Rowlee v. Sanford, [Feb. 1769] Berk.
C.P. 221, rev'd on default, [Sept. 17691 Hamp. Super. Ct. 141. See also Briggs v. Bennett,
[May 17651 Bris. C.P. 221 (writ abated since directed to improper officer). But a deputy
sheriff who was a resident in a town which was a party to an action could serve process.
See Hopkins
v. Inhabitants of Great Barrington, [Sept. 17691 Berk. C.P. 311.
42
A writ directed to one sheriff, for example, could not be served by another. See
Willson v. Proprietors of Pejepscott, [June 1767] Cumb. Super. Ct. 269; Williams v.
Fairfield, [July 17691 Essex C.P. 432. A writ directed to a sheriff could not be served by a
constable. SeeReed v. Purrinton, [Oct. 1771] Ply. C.P. 316; Norwood v. Pulcifer, [Sept.
17681 Essex C.P. 325. And a writ directed to a coroner could not be served by a deputy
sheriff. SeeJennison v. Stone, Suff. Files No. 152271 (Worc. Super. Ct. 1767); Whitney v.
Adams, [Feb. 17691 Berk. C.P. 234. A writ could, however, be directed to more than I
officer if there were need to do so; such a need would arise, for example, in cases
involving joint defendants living in different counties. SeeWilliams v. Fosse, [Aug. 1765]
Bris. C.P. 280.
43See [1699] Mass. Laws ch. 3, § 4. See generally 1 LEGALPAPERS, supranote4, at lxviii.
44See Harwood v. Cragin, [Mar. 17741 Berk. C.P. 300; Hodges v. Gilmore, [Oct.
1765] Bris. Super. Ct. 310; Ely v. Burbank, [May 1767] Hamp. C.P. 95; Dole v.
Tollansbee, [Sept. 1764] Essex C.P. 402. But see Fowler v. Barber, [May 17621 Hamp.
C.P. 307 (writ not abated if proper term of court is stated therein, but that term is slightly
misdated).
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be joined in litigation were joined and that parties who ought not
be joined were not. Rules on this subject were quite technical.45
joint obligors and joint promissors, for example, both had to be
joined in a suit on their promise and process had to be served on
both of them. 46 Joint promissees also had to be joined, although a
husband was not required to join his wife if a promise had been
made jointly to her,47 for a wife was "neither privy to the
Contract nor the Person to whom the Money is to be paid."4 A
wife, on the other hand, would have to join her husband,49 even
if she were a white woman and he were a Negro slave. 50 Tenants
in common were also required to join in land pleas and in
personal actions such as trespass, assumpsit and nuisance. 51 Joint
bailors, on the other hand, did not have to sue their bailee
together, 52 and agents were not required to be joined in suits
against their principals.53 A plaintiff also had to be certain to
bring any executor or administrator before the court in cases of
claims for or against a decedent. 5 '
The most technical of all the pleading rules required the
parties to litigation to be precisely identified. Pursuant to this
requirement, civil and criminal actions were dismissed when
there was no person who had the name and description given the
defendant in the writ.5 5 Civil and criminal actions were similarly
dismissed for failing to state the full name of a party to the writ5
45A claim of improper joinder could be raised only by a plea in abatement, and
failure to make such timely objection constituted a waiver thereof. See Keep v. Prescott,
7 (1773).
Cushing
46
SeeBanks v.Jordan, [June 17671 Cumb. Super. Ct. 271; Ingersoll v. Baker, [May
1773] Berk. C.P. 549; Ingersoll v. Read, [Sept. 1766] Berk. C.P. 364. Principal and
surety could be sued as joint promisors. See Porter v. White, [Mar. 1763] Essex C.P. 465.
Coexecutors and coadministrators were required to be joined. SeeRogers v. Orne, [Mar.
17641 Essex C.P. 325. It was not necessary, however, that the goods of all promisors be
attached. See Tripp v. Durfey, [Oct. 1761]Bris. Super. Ct. 261 (rev'g on undetermined
grounds).
47
See Kent v. Pratt, [Aug. 1764] Hamp. C.P. 262, appeal dismissed, [Sept. 17641
Hamg. Super. Ct. 41.
SJohn A dams' CommonplaceBook, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS, supranote 4, at 18.
49
SeeDaniels v. Bowin, [Sept. 1764] Worc. Super. Ct. 4.
50
SeeCaesarv. Taylor (1771-1772), in 2 LEGAL PAPERS, supranote 4, at 59,61.
51
See Prescott v. Keep (1771-1776), in 1 LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 4, at 266, 268;
Pennel v. Small, [June 1764] York Super. Ct. 271; Marston v. Coombs, [July 17721
Essex C.P. Files; Fowler v. Sacket, [Aug. 1766] Hamp. C.P. 227. If one tenant in
common died during the pendency of the action, the action survived to the remaining
tenants.
See Prescott v. Priest, Cushing 4 (1773).
52
SeeChoate v. Severy, [Mar. 1765] Essex C.P. 442.
53
SeePerkins v. Goldthwait, [Nov. 1766] Hamp. C.P. 8.
54
SeeGraves v. King, [Sept. 1768] Berk. C.P. 82.
55
SeeHart v. Eaton, [Nov. 1766] Essex Super. Ct. 175; Rex v. Sprague, [May 1768]
Hamr. .G.S.
79.v. Ingersoll, [Aug. 1763] Hamp. C.P. 126. Contra,Morey v. Richardson,
See Flint
[Sept. 1762] Bris. C.P. 559.
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or for misspelling or otherwise misstating a party's name either his Christian name5 8 or his surname. 59 An even greater
need for certainty in naming parties occurred in suits in which
corporate parties were involved, and here too writs were abated
60
for misnomers.
In addition to requiring that a plaintiff give all parties their
proper names, the law further required him to state correctly,
without any misspelling, the town and county in which each
party resided. 6 1 This requirement that a writ state the residence
of the parties served not only to identify them, but also to insure
that service of process was made upon a defendant at his proper
residence. 62 Moreover, since venue in transitory actions depended upon at least one of the parties being a resident of the
county in which the63suit was brought, the rule also served to
insure proper venue.
57

See Wheeler v. Cole, [May 17671 Bris. C.P. 451. But see King v. Collins, [Mar.
17661 Essex G.S. 80 (abatement for misnomer denied in criminal case). The
Massachusetts rules were substantially the same as the English rules on misnomers. See
fenerally H. STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS

319

824).
5
8SeeAtwater v. Merwin, [May 1774] Berk. C.P. 427.
59
SeeParsons v. Waunchuauncet, [May 17731 Berk. C.P. 546; Mace v. Rogers, [Aug.
17671 Hamp. C.P. 134; Aldridge v. Prat, [May 1767] Bris. C.P. 465; Cullar v. Wood,
[Nov. 1764]Worc. C.P. 409.
6
°Housatonnock Proprietors v. Williams, [Sept. 17711 Hamp. Super. Ct. 155, af/'g
[Sept.1 17711 Berk. C.P. 284.
, See Ballard v. McLean, Quincy 106 (1764) (town misstated); Watson v. Ulley,
[Sept. 1761] Hamp. Super. Ct. 254 (county misstated); Brown v. Will, [May 1760] Ply.
Super. Ct. 34 (town misstated); Seymour v. Way, [Sept. 17701 Berk. C.P. 24 (town
misnamed); Younglove v. Fonda, [Sept. 1770] Berk. C.P. 615 (county not stated); Bliss
v. Mason, [Aug. 1770] Hamp. C.P. 533 (county misstated); Griffin v. Hilyer, [Feb. 1770]
Berk. C.P., rev'd on default, [Sept. 17701 Hamp. Super. Ct. 181 (town misstated); Perrigo
v. Howard, [Oct. 17691 Ply. C.P. 13 (town misstated); Hickok v. Spoor, [Sept. 17691
Berk. C.P. 348 (town misstated); Warner v. Ramsdell, [Aug. 17691 Hamp. C.P. 440
(residence misstated); Russell v. Diamond, [May 1769] Msex. C.P. Files (town and
county not stated); Latham v. Turner, [Dec. 17661 Ply. C.P. 231, rev'd on defaul4 [May
17671 Ply. Super. Ct. 236 (town misspelled); Blankinship v. Holmes, [Oct. 17661 Ply.
C.P. 218 (town misstated); Burghardt v. North, [Sept. 1766] Berk. C.P. 282 (county not
stated); Fonda v. Fitch, [Sept. 17661 Berk. C.P. 361 (town misstated); Cobb v. Soper,
[Aug. 17651 Bris. C.P. 285 (town misstated); Briggs v. Bennett, [May 1765] Bris. C.P.
221 (county not stated and town misstated); Fellows v. Campbell, [May 1764] Worc.
C.P. 338 (county not stated); Duboys v. Gelusiah, [Sept. 17631 Berk. C.P. 295 (county
misspelled); Flint v. Ingersoll, [Aug. 17631 Hamp. C.P. 126 (town abbreviated); Lee v.
Lee, [July 1763] Essex C.P. 249 (county not stated); Fuller v. Clark, [Dec. 17621 Msex.
C.P. 380 (town misstated); Fosburg v. Fuller, [Sept. 17621 Berk. C.P. 182, appeal
dismissea [Sept. 1763] Hamp. Super. Ct. 169 (town misstated); Roberts v. Church, [Apr.

1762] Berk. C.P. 84 (town misspelled). But seeJackson v. Munro, [Nov. 17661 Bris. C.P.
427 (abatement for misspelling province denied). The English rule, again, was the same
as that in Massachusetts. See Turvil v. Aynsworth, 2 Ld. Raym. 1515, 92 Eng. Rep. 483

[K.B.62 (1727)].
See Levi v. Page, [July 17721 Essex C.P. 311 (waiver upon consent of plea in
abatement that defendant's residence was misstated with result that he was not properly
served).
63
See Cobb v. Soper, [Aug. 1765] Bris. C.P. 285 (dismissal for improper venue). On
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In order to provide further identification of the parties, the
plaintiff was also required to state correctly the addition, that is,
65
4
the occupation or social rank, of both plaintiff and defendant.
Failure to do so was ground for abatement of a writ, and, in
criminal cases, for dismissal of an indictment. 66 More suits were
abated or dismissed for improper additions than on any other
ground. Much elaborate learning existed on the subject of
additions: one finds the bench and bar of the Superior Court
debating, for instance, whether the description of blacksmith
includes a nailor 67 and whether a militia captain is a gentleman
by way of commission, reputation or courtesy. 68 In one case, a
the plaintiff's testator had been
writ was even abated because
69
addition.
improper
an
given
As noted earlier, many pleading rules were carried to such
extremes that they ceased to serve any rational function. For
example, a frequently invoked rule provided that a defendant
the requirement that at least one party in a transitory action be a resident of the county in
which suit was brought, see Ward v. Carter, [Sept. 17711 Msex. C.P. 122. See also W.
Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law During the Revolutionary Era, April,
1971, at 17 n.45 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file in Widener Library, Harvard
University).
64
See Wise v. Hight, [June 1767] York Super. Ct. 278 (plaintiff should be called
gentleman, not yeoman); Homan v. Tucker, [Dec. 1766] Essex C.P. 56 (no allegation
that plaintiff an administrator); Willmot v. Gray, [Sept. 1763] Berk. C.P. 300 (plaintiff
should be called yeoman, not gentleman); Phelps v. Kellogg, [May 1763] Hamp. C.P. 95
(plaintiff should be called gentleman, not esquire); Sumner v. Dudley, [Apr. 1762] Berk.
(plaintiff should be called yeoman, not gentleman).
C.P. 90
65Bromfield v. Lovejoy, Quincy 237 (1767) (defendant should be called gentleman,
not yeoman); Pickard v. Lowell, [Nov. 17671 Essex Super. Ct. 87 (defendant should be
called tanner, not blacksmith); Pell v. Fellows, [Sept. 1770] Berk. C.P. 618 (defendant
should be called gentleman, not yeoman); Wheelock v. Goodspeed, [Aug. 1769] Worc.
C.P. 525 (defendant should be called yeoman, not gentleman); Whiting v. Naunaumphtaunk, [Feb. 17691 Berk. C.P. 228 (defendant should be called gentleman, not yeoman);
Rotch v. Brock, [Mar. 1768] Nan. C.P. 236 (defendant should be called mariner, not
gentleman); Ames v. Lathrop, [Jan. 17671 Suff. C.P. Files (defendant should be called
blacksmith, not husbandman); Storer v. Twiss, [Dec. 1766] Essex C.P. 67 (defendant
should be called administratrix, not executrix); Hickok '. Sheldon, [Sept. 1765] Berk.
C.P. 184 (defendant should be called gentleman, not yeoman); Lee v. Martin, [Apr.
17651 Berk. C.P. 70 (defendant's addition not stated); Eames v. Hayward, [May 1764]
Msex. C.P. 579, appealdismissed, [Apr. 1765] Msex. Super. Ct. 163 (defendant should be
called yeoman, not gentleman); Cheney v. Child, [Aug. 1763] Worc. C.P. 55 (defendant
should be called laborer, not yeoman); Burbank v. Worster, [Aug. 1761] Hamp. C.P. 239
(defendant should be called spinster, not widow); Bumpas v. Whitten, [Oct. 17601 Ply.
C.P. 55 (defendant should be called laborer, not yeoman); Walker v. Colby, [May 1760]
Worc. C.P. 289 (defendant should be called husbandman, not housewright). The rules
concerning additions were applied even more strictly in England, where "names of
dignity" as well as additions had to be written in proper form. See H. STEPHEN, A
TREATISE ON THEPRINCIPLES OF PLEADING INCIVILACTIONS 319-21 (1824).
16See King v. Miller, [Mar. 1774] Essex G.S. 339 (defendant should be called
not yeoman). For civil cases, see notes 64-65 supra.
gentleman,
67
SeeBlower v. Campbell, Quincy 8 (1763).
68SeeBromfield v. Lovejoy, Quincy 237 (1767).
69 See Whiting v. Whiting, [Sept. 1767] Berk. C.P. 4 (plaintiff's testator should be
called esquire, not gentleman).
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could obtain abatement of a writ if he had the same name as his
father and was not called "junior," as long as both father and son
were of the same town.70 Similarly, a defendant who was
mistakenly called "junior" could obtain abatement." Munson v.
Clark,72 a paternity suit, is illustrative. The rule in paternity was
that a mother could not obtain support for her illegitimate child
unless she had accused the defendant of being its father during
the time of her "travail., 73 In Munson, the mother had accused
the defendant of being the father, but since she had failed to call
him "junior" during the course of her accusation, the court
dismissed her suit. Munson, of course, is an extreme case, which,
however, shows that at least some cases turned on such useless
technicalities.
A plaintiff finally had to surmount several other procedural
obstacles. One was the requirement that his writ be endorsed
either by himself or by his attorney, 74 the endorser being liable
for costs in the event the plaintiff lost his action. 75 Another
requirement was that the writ bear the teste of the appropriate
70

See Zuill v. Bradley, Quincy 6 (1762); Goodspeed v. Gay, [May 1763] Barns.
Super. Ct. 47; Trefrey v. Thaxter, [July 1768] Suff. C.P. Files; Fearing v. Pearce, [Apr.
1767] Ply. C.P. 269; Thayer v. Brown, [Aug. 17621 Worc. C.P. 51. In cases in which 2
unrelated persons in the same town had the same name but the plaintiff failed to style one
of them "the younger," see Ely v. Smith, [Aug. 1762] Hamp. C.P. 39, or "the second of
that name," see Willson v. Luther, Suff. Files No. 145402 (Bris. Super. Ct. 1768);
Thomson v. Woolcot, Suff. Files No. 152195 (Worc. Super. Ct. 1766); the possibility of
confusion was as great as in cases involving identically named fathers and sons. The
courts, however, were never clear as to whether the misnomer rule applied in such cases.
In 2 cases they held it did, see Gifford v. Butter, [Dec. 1772] Bris. C.P. 402; Leonard v.
Porter, [May 17671 Bris. C.P. 455, but in others they ignored the purpose of the rule,
applying custom rather narrowly, simply because it was custom, and refused to extend it
to an analogous case. See Ballard v. McLean, Quincy 106 (1764). See also Willson v.
Luther, Suff. Files No. 145402 (Bris. Super. Ct. 1768); Thomson v. Woolcot, Suff. Files
No. 152195 (Worc. Super. Ct. 1766); Ely v. Smith, [Aug. 1762] Hamp. C.P. 39.
Likewise, a court refused to abate a writ in which a plaintiff gave a defendant an improper
alias. See Wheeler v. Cole, Suff. Files No. 145315 (Bris. Super. Ct. 1767). Here too a
potential for confusion existed, but the court declined to look at whatever underlying
rationale
the misnomer rule may have had.
71
SeeWillson v. Luther, [Aug. 1767] Bris. C.P. 498; Deboys v. Bement, [Sept. 17631
Berk. C.P. 294. Cf Leonard v. Porter, [May 17671 Bris. C.P. 455 (abated for calling
defendant
"the second" when he was in fact "the third").
72
[May 1771] Hamp. G.S. 174.
73
SeeThyot v. Whitman, [July 1770] Essex G.S. 201; Act of Nov. 1, 1692, ch. 18, § 5,
1 Mass.
Acts and Resolutions 52, cited in 1 LEGAL PAPERS, supranote 4, at 320.
74
See Waldo v. Haskell, [July 1765] York Super. Ct. 92; Daniels v. Smith, [Aug.
1764] Suff. Super. Ct. 110; Dodge v. Manning, [Sept. 1767] Essex C.P. 175; How v.
Manning, [Mar. 1766] Essex C.P. 587; Eday v. Phelps, [Apr. 1764] Berk. C.P. 377;
Green v.Jones, [May 1762] Worc. C.P. 432. An endorsement by the defendant's rather
than the plaintiff's attorney was insufficient. See Blood v. Blood, [Mar. 1762] Msex. C.P.
278. In replevin, a plaintiff also had to give a bond to prosecute his action. See Davis v.
.Smith,
75 [Nov. 17611 Worc. C.P. 378.
See Ingraham v. Cook, Quincy 4, 5 (1762) (dictum) (new endorser required
whenever "it could be made to appear to the Court that there was Danger the present
Indorser could not answer Costs").
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court official-in the case of Common Pleas, the first justice. 76 A

writ would also be abated if another writ were already pending
on the same cause of action, 77 and a suit by an administrator
would be abated if he failed to produce his letters of
administration. 78 A plaintiff was also required to allege
damages 79 and, moreover, to make the allegation in proper
form.8' Finally, he had to avoid the pitfall of a variance-that is,
an inconsistency in his allegations, either within his writ 8 1 or
between a writ and sa4 subsidiary instrument, such as a bond, 82 an
account, or a will.
II.

THE DEMAND FOR REFORM IN THE LATE

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:JOINDER, SERVICE

OF PROCESS, AND VENUE

In the 1780's these various rules of pleading and procedure,
and the manner in which they were manipulated by lawyers,
were frequently attacked, particularly in the agrarian
strongholds of western Massachusetts, as oppressive and unduly
expensive. To some observers, "judicial proceeding[s]" appeared so "intricate" that their usual outcome was only "to
throw an honest man out of three quarters of his property" if he
76See Smith v. Moody, [Sept. 17641 Hamp. Super. Ct. 34; Clark v. Moody, [Sept.
1764] Hamp. Super. Ct. 33; Dwight v. Spencer, [Feb. 1760] Hamp. C.P. Files. Cf
Volentine
v. Stephens, [Dec. 1764] Bris. C.P. 200 (abated for improper date of teste).
77

See Bacon v. Hayward, [May 1767] Worc. C.P. 192; Brown v. Rowley, [Sept.
1764] Berk. C.P. 472.
78See Powell v. Pettit, [Sept. 17601 Hamp. Super. Ct. 128, rev'g [Feb. 17601 Hamp.
C.P. 79Files.
See Hayward v. Lothrop, [Oct. 1768] Bris. Super. Ct. 290; 1 LEGAL PAPERS, Supra
note 4, at 33 n.22.
80
See Hayward v. Lothrop, [Oct. 1768] Bris. Super. Ct. 290; Gilbert v. Chace, [Dec.
1773] Bris. C.P. 61; Thayer v. Thayer, [May 1762] Worc. C.P. 415, appeal dismissed,
[Sept. 1762] Worc. Super. Ct. 412. But see Spencer v. Cooley, [May 17611 Hamp. C.P.
Files, appeal dismissed, ISept. 1761] Hamp. Super. Ct. 258.
81See Smith v. Moody, [Sept. 1764] Hamp. Super. Ct. 34 (abated for saying in one
part of writ that cattle were "distrained" and in another part that cattle were "detained");
Clark v. Moody, [Sept. 1764] Hamp. Super. Ct. 33 (same); Bowen v. Kelley, [Mar.
1774] Bris. C.P. 76 (abated for variance between writ in account and declaration in case);
Rowley v. Sheldon, [Feb. 17701 Berk. C.P. 477 (abated for repugnancy in description of
land).2
8 See Paddock v. Pratt, [Oct. 1768] Ply. C.P. 439. But see Gager v. Mattoon, [Nov.
1760] Hamp. C.P. 190, [Feb. 1761] Hamp. C.P. 201, appeal dismissed, [Sept. 1762]
Hamp.
Super. Ct. 416 (overruling plea alleging variance).
"3 SeeCobb v. Barstow, [Dec. 1760] Bris. C.P. 417. Cf Burnal v. Gwin, [Mar. 1770]
Nan. C.P. 252 (abated since no account annexed to writ).
84See Ashley v. Ashley, [Feb. 1771] Berk. C.P. 292, appeal dismissed, [Apr. 1771]
Hamp. Super. Ct. 90. However, if there was a constructional issue whether a will was
consistent with a writ, the will was admitted into evidence for the jury to construe. See
Gibbs v. Gibbs, Quincy 251 (1767).
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put his case to law."5 Opponents of the common law system
contended that "the state of pleading in this Commonwealth
[had become such] that an honest man... [could] not obtain"
right and justice "without being obliged to employ a lawyer, at a
great expence." 8 6 "Artful men in England," they explained,
"ha[d] so entangled the mode of managing a cause with the nice
distinction of special pleas (and ... [the courts in Massachusetts
had] unfortunately adopted the pernicious practice) that in short
justice . . . [could] scarcely be obtained unless it be dearly
purchased.""7 "[I]nstead of obtaining justice 'freely,' 'completely,' and 'promptly,' " many litigants saw their "causes...
carried through every tedious labyrinth 88 and juries "hindered
from coming to a speedy decision
of a cause, by the labouring
89
law.
common
the
of
pleadings"
Reformers in the 1780's accordingly sought to abandon
technical and outmoded pleading forms and have judgments
rendered "according to the merits of the case." 90 "[P]leas," it
was urged, should "be simple, and the clerk [should be]
authorized to write them in short form for each of the parties."'"
There existed no "occasion or need . . . of all the parade of
written pleas, replications, rejoinders, &c. &c. in common trials
at law," since all that a court needed to know was "the fact, the
law, and the equity of the case.",92 Then, it was contended, the
issue of causes would not "depend upon adroitness of advocates
[but] upon their intrinsic justice."9 3 Specifically, the
legislature was urged to enact a statute "for pleading the general
issue in all cases, and admitting special matter to be given in
evidence" thereunder, as a "means of opening more fully the
merits of the cause, and being free from necessity of making
94
formal pleas."
Dissatisfaction with the expense and technicality of common
law procedure culminated during Shays' Rebellion, in which
high litigation costs, high taxes and lack of currency were the
8sB. AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE LAW 3-4 (1794)

(originally published in the 1780's under the pseudonym "Honestus") [hereinafter cited
as AUSTIN].
"176Boston Gazette, May 13, 1782, at 1, col. 2.
1d col. 1.
88
89AUSTIN, supra note 85, at 29.
1d 9.
90
Letter from James Neale to Robert Treat Paine, June 6, 1794, on file in
Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.
91
Bostoti Gazette, May 13, 1782, at 1, col. 1.
92
Boston Gazette, May 6, 1782, at 1, col. 3.
93
9 4Hubbell v. Hoose, [Feb. 18241 Berk. C.P. 8.
Boston Gazette, May 13, 1782, at 1, col. 2.
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chief complaints." Prior to that disturbance, however, the courts
and the legal profession had begun to take hesitant steps toward
reform. The process of reform was a gradual and ambiguous one,
and the reasons for it are often unclear. Reform occurred
piecemeal, as individual lawyers, either lacking in precise
knowledge of common law pleading rules or seeking some
strategic advantage in litigation at hand, entered pleas that were
not in proper form. Although opposing counsel sometimes
waived the informality, the want of form was often called to the
court's attention. The courts, however, sensing the validity of
reformers' complaints about the undue expense of technical
pleading rules and perceiving that reduced adherence to form
threatened no tangible interest of the law or the legal
profession,96 often decided to permit counsel either to ignore or
to amend the informality. As various decisions of this sort
cumulated over time, the ancient system of common law
pleading was destroyed, and new rules of pleading emerged in its
place. But, while destruction of the old technical pleading system
was, at least in part, a response to conscious awareness of its
deficiencies, there is no evidence that men perceived the
contours of the new system until, after it had largely come into
existence, they began to articulate the reality that confronted
them.
The first step was taken quite early, in September 1776,
when the Superior Court adopted a rule providing that prior to
joinder in demurrer, any plaintiff could "have leave to amend his
Writ and declaration upon his paying the Deft. his costs" to the
date of the amendment or "agreeing to a Continuance at the
Defts. Election."9 7 This new rule was not given immediate effect
in some of the lower courts, which continued to dismiss cases on
technical grounds, 98 until the legislature provided in 1784 that
5

9 See R. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REVOLUTION 103-15, 128-36

(1954).
96
Seetext accompanying note 4 supra.

97
Worc. Super. Ct. Rule (1776), copied in note appended to Biscoe v. Gale (Msex.
S.J.C. 1789), in F. Dana, Minute Books (mss. in Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston,
Mass.) thereinafter cited as Dana].
98
See Gage v. Noyes, [Apr. 17841 Essex C.P. 68, plea in abatement withdrawn, [une
1784] Essex S.J.C. 174 (abated for improper addition); Gerrish v. Carr, [Apr. 17821
Essex C.P. 211 (same); Mackintire v.Jones, [Dec. 1781] Worc. C.P. 284 (same); Parks v.
Sacket, [Nov. 17831 Hamp. C.P. 93 (abated for improperly describing self as
administrator of the "Rights & Credits" rather than of the "Goods & Chattels" of
decedent and for senseless language in writ and failure to aver date of note); Hammond
v. Delano, [Apr. 17831 Ply. C.P. 480 (abated for not pursuing Register). Judicial
obstruction of reform was not limited to Massachusetts during this period. Ambitious
procedural reform in Georgia was also hindered by the courts. See L. FRIEDMAN, A
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judicial proceedings should not "be abated, arrested, quashed or
reversed for any kind of circumstantial errours [sic] or mistakes.
. . nor through defect or want of form only."'99 The same act

explicitly confirmed the power of the courts "on motion... [to]
order amendments."' 100 The rule and the statute even then had
no effect upon the question of misjoinder of parties,' which was
deemed "an exception to the merits," at least in contract
actions," 2 but upon other technical questions of pleading its
effects were transforming. By the mid-1780's it was clear that
misnomers

03 and

1

errors in additions 10 4 were freely amendable; 105

indeed, there is no record of any suit being dismissed after
99Law of Oct. 30,1784, § 14, 1 [1780-1807] Laws of Mass. 207.

100 1d
101
Rules on joinder of parties remained exceedingly complex and technical. Some of
the basic rules were as follows: In contract actions, joint promisors and joint promisees all
had to be joined. See Drury v. Baxter, [Apr. 1825] Suff. C.P. 41; Belcher v. Ward, [Mar.
18251 Worc. C.P. 68, appeal dismisse4 [Oct. 1826] Worc. SJ.C. 638; Shaw v. Bottom,
[Mar. 18251 Worc. C.P. 19; Allen v. Wing, [Aug. 18161 Ply. C.P. 122 n.31, affd by
referees, [Oct. 1816] Ply. SJ.C. 190; Adams v. Savage, [uly 1816] Suff. C.P. 240;
Kearney v. McMullock, [Sept. 1812] Suff. C.P. 125. This was true even if the plaintiff
had no knowledge of the existence of the joint promisor. See Niles v. Prescott, [Sept.
18021 Worc. SJ.C. 157. However, an administrator had to be sued in his representative
rather than his personal capacity, see Francis v. Wynn, [uly 1782] Essex C.P. 337, appeal
dismissed, [June 1783] Essex S.J.C. 119, and therefore an administrator could not join
with a surviving promisee to recover on a contract right of the decedent. Smith v.
Franklin, I Mass. 480 (1805); Walker v. Maxwell, 1 Mass. 104, 112-13 (1804). Persons
with a subsidiary interest in a contract right could not join with the principal promisee to
enforce the right. Grozier v. Atwood, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 234 (1826). Cf Baxter v.
Rodman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 435, 438-39 (1826).Joint tortfeasors need not be joined in a
single action, see Mitchell v. Keith, [Oct. 1789] Ply. C.P. 405, nor could they be joined if
only one of them had actually committed the tort and the other's liability was of a
derivative nature. Campbell v. Phelps, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 62, 66-68 (1822).Joint victims
of a personal tort could notjoin, since their injuries were of a separate rather than a joint
nature. Baker v. Jewell, 6 Mass. 460 (1810) (dictum). Co-owners of property, on the
other hand, were required to join in suits brought to recover for tortious damage to the
property. See Daniels v. Daniels, 7 Mass. 135 (1810); Derby v. Harraden, [uly 17791
Essex C.P. 520. See also Thompson v. Hoskins, 11 Mass. 419 (1814) (misjoinder must be
objected to upon plea in abatement). Tenants in common, however, could not join to
recover the property itself. See Inhabitants of Rehoboth v. Hunt, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 224,
228 (1822). Other joint owners could, but were not required to, join in suits to recover
their property. Oxnard v. Proprietors of Kennebeck Purchase, 10 Mass. 179 (1813).Joint
guardians could maintain suit together. Shearman v. Akins, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 283,
291-92 (1826). Parties who had once been joined could not thereafter be severed for
causes such as want of evidence of their joint liability, see Brett v. Proprietors of West
Shore, [May 1790] Ply. SJ.C. 103, disability, Fee Oxnard v. Proprietors of Kennebeck
Purchase, 10 Mass. 179 (1813), or death, see Cutts v. Haskins, 11 Mass. 56 (1814). A
settlement by a defendant with one of several joint plaintiffs did not, however, preclude
the maintenance
of suit by the others. Baker v.Jewell, 6 Mass. 460 (1810).
02
Baker v.Jewell, 6 Mass. 460, 462 (1810).
3
'°
SeeSherman v. Proprietors of Connecticut River Bridge, 11 Mass. 338 (1814).
10
4SeeKincaid v. Howe, 10 Mass. 203 (1813); Holcomb v. Root, [May 1792] Hamp.
C.P. 84. Cf Atkins v. Sawyer, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 351, 353-54 (1823) (dictum)
(permitting amendment of judgment rendered "against the administrator" to read
"against the goods and estate of the intestate").
105See generally S. Howe, Lectures on the Practice of the Courts, 115-16 (mss. in
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1784 for a misnomer or an improper addition.1 0 Other technical
errors, such as a mistake in a party's residence, 10 7 failure on the
part of an infant to bring his suit by a prochein ami,10 8 failure to
have a writ properly attested, 1 9 an error in the ad damnum of a
writ, 1 0 and errors in the plaintiff's statement of his claim"' could
also be cured by amendment. Plaintiffs were even permitted to
add new counts to their writs if those counts were consistent with
12
and for the same cause of action as the original counts,
although such amendments would not be permitted if they
added a new cause of action to the plaintiff's writ 1 3 or otherwise
affected a defendant's substantive rights. 14 Amendments were
Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Howe Lectures].
10 6AIl such motions of which there is a record were denied. See Clark v. Lowe, 15
Mass. 476 (1819); Little v. Putnam, [June 1806] Worc. C.P. 322; Hooper v. Clark, [June
1806] Worc. C.P. 324; Brimmer v. Hussey, [Sept. 17901 Essex C.P. 160; Lynde v. Eppes,
[Sept.0 717851 Essex C.P. 396.
SeeBowers v. Brown, [June 1780] Bris. C.P. 272.
' 0 8 SeeBlood v. Harrington, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 552 (1829).
10 9 See Richmond v. Shearman, [Aug. 1806] Berk. C.P. 88, appeal dismissed, [Sept.
1806] Berk. SJ.C. 386. Cf Howe Lectures, supra note 105, at 118, [citing Ripley v.
Warren, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 592 (1824)]. Contra, Hall v. Jones, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446
(1830); Richardson v. Mooney, [Mar. 18181 Msex. C.P. Files.
1n°See Danielson v. Andrews, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 156 (1822). But see Yale v. Oliver,
[Sept. 1825] Msex. C.P. Files.
11'SeeHolmes v. Holmes, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 23 (1823) (error in allegation of length
of seisin); Cuminge v. Rawson, 7 Mass. 440 (1811) (errors in description of close and
nature of tort). Mere technical informalities often did not even require amendment. See
Kennedy v. Carpenter, [July 1828] Suff. C.P. 22, n.41 (failure to allege notice of
assignment of lease); Arey v. Wetmore, [Jan. 1797] Suff. C.P. 254, affd, [Feb. 1797]
Suff. SJ.C. 26 (failure to allege consideration for promise or time at which payment
promised);Jenks v. Ward, [Sept. 17891 Essex C.P. 340 (failure to allege that plaintiff in
trespass2 was in the peace of the Commonwealth when assault occurred).
1 See Swan v. Nesmith, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 220, 224-25 (1828); Clarke v. Lamb, 23
Mass. (6 Pick.) 512, 515 (1828); Ball v. Claflin, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 303, 304-05 (1827);
Tappan v. Austin, 1 Mass. 31 (1804); Howe Lectures, supra note 105, at 113-14. Cf
Parker v. Parker, 17 Mass. 376, 379 (1821) (permitting plaintiff to restore count
previously stricken when stricken count appeared best to conform to the evidence); Cane
v. Wetmore (Hamp. SJ.C. 1794), in Dana, supra note 97 (permitting plaintiff to
introduce evidence without necessity of amending declaration to conform thereto, since
declaration gave adequate notice of claim). The mere addition of a new count would not
discharge the bail or deprive the plaintiff of his priority over subsequent attaching
creditors, see Miller v. Clark, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 412 (1829) (dictum); Ball v. Claflin, 22
Mass. (5 Pick.) 303, 305 (1827), unless the count was for a new cause of action. See
Putnam v. Hall, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 445 (1826); Willis v. Crooker, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 204
(1822).
13'SeePratt v. Bacon, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 123, 128 (1830); Vancleefv. Therasson, 20
Mass. (3 Pick.) 12 (1825) (dictum); Holbrook v. Gould, [Sept. 18281 Norf. C.P. 157.
Thus, amendment would be denied if the original writ contained no count or declaration,
see Brigham v. Este, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 420, 424-25 (1824); Gates v. Whitney, [Oct.
1825] Suff. C.P. 62, appeal dismissed, [Nov. 1825] Suff. SJ.C. 519; or if the proposed
count were one which could not originally have been joined to the existing count See
Mason v. Waite, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 452 (1823) (by implication).
1 4 SeeBriscoe v. Gale, (Msex. SJ.C. 1789), in Dana, supranote 97. See alsoPetition of
Gardner, [Oct. 1829] Nan. C.P. 52 (overruling objection to proposed amendment of writ
of execution on the ground that substantive rights would be affected thereby).
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permitted after as well as before verdicts 155 and upon documents
other than original writs, such as bills of particulars. 116 Sheriffs'
returns of the mode of service of process and improper directions
in writs concerning such service were also amendable,

17 with

the

result that technical lapses in the service of process were
ignored118 as long as actual service had -been properly made." 9
Thus, courts were slowly coming to the view that the only
115

Stanwood v. Scovel, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 422 (1827); Williams v. Hingham &
Quincy Bridge & Tpke. Corp., 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 341, 349 (1826).
1
1Babcock v. Thompson, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 446, 449 (1826) (dictum). See also Ball
v. Hopkinton Cotton Mfg. Co., [Oct. 18201 Msex. S.J.C. 131 (amendment ordered, in
eminent
1 17 domain case, of description of land in jury venire).
See Adams v. Robinson, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 461 (1823); Thatcher v. Miller, 13
Mass. 270, 271 (1816) (dictum); Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477, 481 (1814) (dictum);
Campbell v. Stiles, 9 Mass. 217 (1812); Hearsey v. Bradbury, 9 Mass. 95 (1812); Swan v.
French (Suff. S.J.C. 1789), in Dana, supranote 97. See also Commonwealth v. Parker, 19
Mass. (2 Pick.) 550, 561 (1824) (constable permitted to amend jury venire). But
amendments by officers did not affect the rights of persons not party to the suit if those
rights were acquired prior to the amendment. Emerson v. Upton, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 167
(1829). Cf Williams v. Brackett, 8 Mass. 240 (1811) (officer cannot amend return in suit
between parties other than the ones involved in the former action). Of course, a technical
defect would still be fatal if the officer failed to amend his writ. See Ward v. Brigham,
[Mar. 18091 Msex. C.P. Files; Reed v. Morris, [Sept. 18031 Worc. C.P. 145, rev'd on
defaul4 [Sept. 18031 Worc. SJ.C. 236; Brown v. Vorce, [Aug. 17931 Worc. C.P. 586;
Clark1 v. Clark, [Mar. 1790] Msex. C.P. 517.
1SSee Lane v. Vernon, [Feb. 1787] Suff. SJ.C. 24 (exception that deputy sheriff who
served writ bad taken oath of office before one justice of the peace instead of two justices
quorum unus overruled).
1"9Basic rules as to service of process were not changed, however, in the postRevolutionary period. Normally, actions had to be commenced either by summons or
capias, see Whitney v. Bigelow, [Dec. 1824] Worc. C.P. 229, affd [Oct. 1826] Worc.
SJ.C. 574; Act of Oct. 30, 1784, 1 [1780-18071 Laws of Mass. 199, although in
exceptional cases the two forms of writ could be combined into one. See Cooke v. Gibbs, 3
Mass. 193 (1807) (opinion of Parsons, CJ.); Bullard v. Ware, [Dec. 18171 Msex. C.P.
Files. Contra, Peirce v. Cody, [Aug. 1793] Worc. C.P. 557, appealdismissed [Sept. 1793]
Worc. SJ.C. 233. If the service were by attachment, it was essential that actual valuable
property of the defendant be attached; otherwise the service was invalid. For examples of
such invalid service, see Bridge v. Marshall, [May 17981 Msex. C.P. Files, affd, [Apr.
1800] Msex. SJ.C. 327 ("a hat the property of the within named" defendant attached);
Harrington v. Reed, [Mar. 1793] Msex. C.P. Files ("a log of wood" attached); Baker v.

Baker, [Apr. 1784] Suff. C.P. Files (heir's interest in undistributed realty attached);
Sprague v. Mansfield, [Apr. 17801 Suff. C.P. Files ("a certain note of hand" attached);
Warren v. Mansfield, [Jan. 1780] Suff. C.P. Files ("public bills of credit of the United
States" attached); Maynard v. Rice, [Mar. 17791 Msex. C.P. Files (goods "reputed to be
Estate of" defendant attached). Moreover, service by attachment had to be accompanied
by actual notice to the defendant. See Farr v. Barrows, [July 1794] Linc. SJ.C. 162. If
service were by summons, it was insufficient simply to read the summons, see Spaulding
v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, [Sept. 1790] Msex. C.P. Files. Rather, it was necessary to
leave the summons at the defendant's last usual and permanent abode, see Richardson v.
Judd, [Apr. 1824] Suff. C.P. Files (leaving summons at factory), even if the building had
been destroyed, see Brown v. Hurlbut, [Mar. 1790] Berk. C.P. 226, but not if the
defendant was an absent and absconding debtor in a suit pursuant to the trustee act. See
Gold v. Stone, [Sept. 17881 Berk. C.P. 30. A return on a writ that the defendant could not
be found within the server's precinct was, of course, an insufficient return, see Sullivan v.
Gragg, [Sept. 1790] Msex. C.P. Files; Otis v. Claflin, [July 1783] Suff. C.P. Files; Wait v.
Fecham, [Apr. 17831 Suff. C.P. Files; Phillips v. Farewell, [Apr. 1783] Suff. C.P. Files;
Hatch v. Newell, [Apr. 1783] Suff. C.P. Files, as was a return that the defendant upon
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material issue was whether the defendant had
had actual
"personal notice and information of the service." 120
One sees in the law of venue a parallel lessening of concern
for form and a growing recognition that technical objections
were of no significance as long as the forum was a fair and
convenient one. The courts, for instance, rejected arguments that
a corporation could have no residence for purposes of venue and
hence could be sued only in the county of which the plaintiff was
a resident; 121 that a sheriff could be sued only in the county of
which he was sheriff; 122 and that, when an act committed in one
county resulted in an injury in another, the plaintiff could bring
suit only in the county of the act. 123 As Chief Justice Parsons
stated, venue was "considered [only] as a necessary part 1of
24
technical form, but not as a substantial part of the writ."'
Elsewhere the Supreme Judicial Court noted that it accorded
little weight to "an objection... which was merely captious and
dilatory in its nature; not at all affecting the merits of the action
... ,"125 "[CIourts in all countries," said the judges, "have
looked with disfavour upon the delay in proposing objections,
which, through adherence to form, would obstruct the course of
justice .... 12
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE
CATEGORIES OF LAW

By the early nineteenth century, then, the concern in
pleading was with substance, not with form. The emerging
arrest paid the debt in full, seeCunningham v. Felton, [Apr. 1783] Suff. C.P. Files, or was
released at the creditor's command upon a part payment. See Webster v. Waite, [Jan.
1780] 0Suff. C.P. Files.
12 Shearer v. Tappan, [Apr. 17981 Berk. C.P. 178.
121SeeTaunton & Boston Tpke. Corp. v. Whiting, [Mar. 1810] Bris. C.P. 70.
12 2See Foster v. Baldwin, 2 Mass. 569 (1786); Legate v. Porter, Cushing 80 (1786);
Swan v. French, (Suff. SJ.C. 1789), in Dana, supra note 97; Bright v. Henderson, [Nov.
1785]23Msex. C.P. 282.
1 SeeBarden v. Crocker, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 383, 390-91 (1830). Cf Thompson v.
Crocker, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 59 (1829) (proof that act causing injury was committed in
county other than one in which suit was brought and venue laid held an immaterial
variance).
124 Briggs v. Nantucket Bank, 5 Mass. 94,96 (1809).
l2265Kincaid v. Howe, 10 Mass. 203,205 (1813).
1 Ripley v. Warren, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 592, 594 (1824). Accordingly the court held
that "all dilatory pleas, or those which amount only to an exception to the form of the
process, are required to be exposed to the view of the court in the first stage," idat 594,
when the plaintiff still had a right to amend, and that failure to make timely objection
constituted a waiver thereof. See Prescott v. Tufts, 7 Mass. 209 (1810); Gilbert v.
Nantucket Bank, 5 Mass. 97 (1809); Cleveland v. Walsh, 4 Mass. 591 (1808); Livermore
v. Boswell, 4 Mass. 437 (1808); Whiting v. Hollister, 2 Mass. 102 (1806); Barrell v.
Farley, [Apr. 1789] Msex. SJ.C. 160. Cf Smith v. Bowker, 1 Mass. 76 (1804). But see
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concern for substance was of great significance, for it compelled
the bench and bar to think about law in substantive categories,
such as "tort" and "contract,"1 27 rather than the old procedural
categories of trespass, assumpsit and the like.
Once men began to think in these new categories, the
ancient system of common law writs began to collapse. Although
defendants throughout the half century after the Revolution
could procure the dismissal of writs which failed to indicate the
"kind of Plea or Action ...brot by the Plft [sic] ... ,,128 which
joined two forms of action,'2 9 or which sought recovery in the
wrong form of action130 or were otherwise "informal"

13 1

or

insufficient, 132 many

plaintiffs nonetheless recovered judgments
upon writs containing such defects when their opponents
either
failed to object or raised their objection unseasonably. 33 There
Rathbone v. Rathbone, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 89 (1826) (plea in abatement by defendant
who lacked
notice of suit not waived by delay).
12 7SeeHaggins v. Henderson, (Suff. SJ.C. 1793), in Dana, supranote 97; Williams v.
Gore 2(Suff. SJ.C. 1792), in id; Henderson v. Bethume (Suff. SJ.C. 1791), in id
1 8Watson v. Robinson, [Aug. 17891 Hamp. C.P. 121.
1
2See Harris v. Fullam, [Mar. 1807] Worc. C.P. 405 (demurrer for joining count in
tort for injuring plaintiff's horse and count in contract for not paying therefor sustained);
Barker v. Burrell, [July 18051 Suff. C.P. 3 (plaintiff in trespass nonsuited for joining to
writ declaration lying in case); Schermerhorn v. Willard, [Jan. 1797] Berk. C.P. 160,
appeal dismissed, [Oct. 1798] Berk. SJ.C. 123 (demurrer for joining claims on bond and

promissory note sustained); Codman v. Henderson, [July 17891 Suff. C.P. 57, rev'd on
default, [Feb. 1790] Suff. SJ.C. 26 (abated for joining counts against sheriff in tort for not
serving writ and in contract for breach of promise to serve it). But 2 varieties of the same
form of action, such as trover, a variety of case, and case, could be joined. See Ayer v.
Bartlett, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 156, 161 (1829).
13°SeeLienow v. Ritchie, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 235 (1829) (landlord not in possession of
premises must bring case, not trespass, for damages done thereto by a stranger) ;Jones v.
Hoar, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 285 (1827) (landowner must sue in trespass or trover for cutting
and taking of his trees, unless defendant took trees in pursuance of an agreement or had
sold the trees); Lane v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 281 (1824) (quaerewhether debt can be
brought on a bail bond); Hayden v. Shed, 11 Mass. 500 (1814) (case, not trespass, proper
form of action when goods attached upon writ which is subsequently abated); Agry v.
Young, IIMass. 220 (1814) (trespass, not case, proper form of action against assessors
for wrongful assessment); Banorgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 11, 24-26 (1809) Jassumpsit will
not lie when contract embodied in a bond, even if the bond fails to join all parties to the
original contract); Adams v. Hemmenway, 1 Mass. 145 (1804) (case, not trespass, lies for
indirect injury to profits lost as a result of attempts made to save life of a victim of
gunshot wound inflicted by defendant). But cf White v. Moseley, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 356
(1829) (trespass lies for damage to mill resulting from defendant's destruction of
plaintiff's mill dam); Wiswall v. Austin, [Mar. 1788] Worc. C.P. 469, rev'd on other
grounds, [Sept. 17881 Worc. SJ.C. 2 (debt proper form of action for statutory penalty for
r Lovell v. Francis, [Mar. 1803] Nan. C.P. 8.
132 Bigelow v. Barker, [May 1816] Nan. C.P. 165.
133As to lateness of objection, see Whitney v. Russell, [Dec. 1782] Msex. SJ.C. 363
(motion in arrest of judgment overruled in "plea of taking imprisoning and detaining"
the plaintiff); Sacket v. Bishop, [Nov. 1822] Hamp. C.P. 21 (motion in arrest for suing in
case rather than trespass in wagon collision case overruled); Maynard v. Currant, [July
1806] Suff. C.P. 37 (motion in arrest for joining causes of action for breach of contract

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 122:97

were, for example, many actions in which plaintiffs were
victorious which were given no name-one was labelled merely
"a plea of Grievous complaint;" 134 another, a "Plea of the for the
Recovery" of certain nails; 135 a third, "a Plea for not performing
his [the defendant's] promise."1 36 Others merely stated the facts
upon which the plantiffs relied. 37 There were also cases in which
plaintiffs gave their writs the substantive name of their cause of
action rather than their proper formal name-pleas, for instance,
of "Trover & conversion," ' 138 of "Assault & Battrey,"' 139 of
"Defamation"' 140 and of "possession."' 141 As technical rules
concerning the propriety and forms of writs were "gradually
relaxed"' 4 2 and ignored, in still other cases, plaintiffs either
brought the wrong writ-covenant and debt upon an unsealed
145
1 44
agreement, 143 case upon a sealed agreement case for dower,
or case for a trespass committed with force and arms146 -or

joined two forms of action in a single writ, 147 and nonetheless
were able to recover judgment.
and for statutory penalty overruled). But see Paul v. Frazer, [Jan. 18071 Suff. C.P. 263,
affd, [Mar. 1807] Suff. SJ.C. 203 (motion in arrest for failure to state a cause of action
granted).
134 Coe v. Cornwall, [Aug. 18011 Hamp. C.P. 154, appeal dismissed, [May 1802]
Hamp.5 SJ.C. 435.
13 Lumbart v. Washbourn, [Oct. 1797] Dukes C.P.
136King v. Sykes [May 17831 Hamp. C.P. 240. Accord, Shaw v. Billings, [May 1795]
Hamp. C.P. 122; Phelps v. Munroe, [Jan. 1793] Hamp. C.P. 131; Pearce v. Bucklin,
[Sept:37 1781] Bris. C.P. 371, rev'don defaul, [Oct. 17811 Bris. S.J.C. 101.
1 See Corsa v. Noble, [Oct. 1799] Berk. SJ.C. 242; Lumbert v. Hoyt, [Oct. 1804]
Nan. C.P. 103; Porter v. Atwater, [Nov. 17981 Hamp. C.P. 332; Sumner v. Lackor,
[Sept.3 81798] Hamp. C.P. 126.
1 Remington v. Palmer, [Sept. 18111 Hamp. SJ.C. 260. Accord, Barney v. Mason,
[Oct. 1799] Bris. SJ.C. 102; Wheelock v. Tupper, [Oct. 1783] Nan. C.P. 306. See also
Divol139v. Gibbs, [Nov. 1782] Bris. SJ.C. 312 ("Case for trover").
Nosavet v. Stat, [Oct. 1788] Dukes C.P.
140Athcarn v. Hancock, [Oct. 1793] Dukes C.P.
' 1 Sewell v. Sawyer, [May 1804] Hamp. C.P. 69.
14Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 285 n. (1827).
143SeeEwer v. Handy, [Oct. 1801] Nan. C.P.; Luce v. Volintin, [Apr. 1798] Dukes
C.P.; Sears v. Easton, [Feb. 1785] Hamp. C.P. 129.
144SeeJenkins v. Brewster, [Sept. 1817] Hamp. SJ.C. 134; Williams v. Sampyon,
[Aug. 1787] Suff. SJ.C. 172; Parkman v.Jefferson, [Oct. 1821] Suff. C.P. 418; Swett v.
Poor, [Sept. 1813] Essex C.P. 35, affd [Nov. 1814] Essex SJ.C. 98; Hinckley v. George,
[Mar. 1800] Nan. C.P.; Taylor v. Eustis, [July 1798] Suff. C.P. 259, affd [Aug. 17991
Suff. SJ.C. 197. Cf Clary v. Parling, [Apr. 1785] Worc. SJ.C. 126 (case upon an
agreement "in imitation of a Penal obligation").
45
1 See Norton v. Norton, [Apr. 1794] Dukes C.P.; Harris v. Fuller, [Aug. 1778]
Hamp. C.P. 228.
""See White v. Jewett, [Jan. 1799] Hamp. C.P. 14, rev'd on defaul [Sept. 1800]
Hamp. S.J.C. 307. Cf Wood v. Vose, [Mar. 1793] Nan. C.P. 85 (case for assault);
Bradford v. Stark, [Sept. 1777] Bris. C.P. 185 (case for assault), rev'd on other grounds,
[Oct. 471778] Bris. Super. Ct. 37 (where writ is labeled as trespass).
1 SeePenniman v. Shaw, [Apr. 1810] Suff. C.P. 674 (counts against sheriff for tort
for not serving writ and for breach of promise to serve it joined). Cf Mixer v. Johnson,
[Dec. 1790] Worc. C.P. 409 (debt and case for recovery of statutory penalty joined).
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It is impossible to attribute all these departures from proper
form solely to carelessness on the part of court clerks, attorneys
and parties not represented by attorneys.1 8 Many of the

departures, in fact, appear to have been conscious attempts on
the part of skilled attorneys to compel the courts to focus on the
substantive rather than the procedural aspects of their cases,
perhaps in order to obtain some tactical advantage. 149 A clear

illustration of such an attempt is Taylor v. Eustis,150 a contract
action in which the plaintiff pleaded the existence of a sealed
promise by the defendant for which consideration had been
given. The plaintiff's successful attempt to sue in case rather than
in debt appears to have been a conscious attempt to subsume
sealed as well as unsealed promises under a single substantive
rubric of contract for which a plaintiff could have an election of
remedies; that is, either in debt, where the court might
determine the amount of damages,' 51 or in assumpsit, where
damages would be fixed by the jury. 152 Despite the fact that
considerable support existed for it,1 3 this particular attempt
would fail in the next decade. 154 However, in many other
instances the Supreme Judicial Court ceased to analyze claims in
procedural terms and instead began to recognize that plaintiffs
possessed substantive rights for the enforcement of which they
could elect one of several writs. In suits for statutory penalties,
for instance, where the statute did not prescribe the remedy, a
plaintiff could bring either trespass, 15T5 debt"' or case. 157
148Some of the departures, however, can be so attributed. See, e.g., Parkman v.

Jefferson, (Oct, 18211 Suff. C.P. 418 (writ of case on a bond, to which the defendant
pleaded that he owed nothing, the proper plea to a writ of debt on a bond); Lumbart v.
Washbourn, [Oct. 1797] Dukes C.P. ("Plea of the for the Recovery" of certain nails). In
the former action, a clerk probably substituted the word "case" for "debt"; in the latter, a
clerk probably left out the name of the action.
149
See, e.g., Coe v. Cornwall, [Aug. 1801] Hamp. C.P. 154, appeal dismissed, [May
1802] Hamp. SJ.C. 435 ("a plea of Grievous complaint" brought by George Bliss, Esq.);
King v. Sykes, [May 1783] Hamp. C.P. 240 ("a Plea for not performing his promise"
brought by Moses Bliss, Esq.).
.O[July 1798] Suff. C.P. 259, affJd [Aug. 17991 Suff. SJ.C.197.
151 Seenote 170 infa.
'52
SeeW. Nelson, supranote 63, at 410 n.28.
'153SeeBanorgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 11,26-35 (1809) (dissenting opinion).
154
See Richards v. Killam, 10 Mass. 239 (1813); Kimball v. Tucker, 10 Mass. 192
(1813); Banorgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 11, 24-26 (1809).
1
"See Reed v. Davis, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 514, 516 (1829) (dictum); Peirce v. Spring,
15 Mass. 489 (1819).
56
1 SeeReed v. Davis, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 514 (1829);Jeffrey v. Bluehill Tpke. Corp.,
10 Mass. 368, 370-71 (1813); Bigelow v. Cambridge & Concord Tpke. Corp., 7 Mass.
202, 204
(1810).
157SeePeabody v. Hoyt, [Apr. 1811] Suff. C.P. 173, rev'don othergrounds,[Mar. 18131
Suff. SJ.C. 243; Scales v. Williams, [Dec. 1805] Msex. C.P. 150, appeal dismissed, [Oct.
1806] Msex. SJ.C. 255; Brooks v. Stow, [Aug. 1790] Worc. C.P. 285.
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Similarly, a plaintiff could maintain trespass, trover or assumpsit
against a trespasser who cut and sold his trees; 158 trespass or case
for damages from a runaway horse frightened by the discharge
of a gun;"1 indebitatus assumpsit or account against a bailiff; 6 °
debt or case for misbehavior by a public officer; 161 and, during
much of the early nineteenth century, trespass or case against a
62
sheriff for a trespass committed by his deputy.1
The SupremeJudicial Court's preference for substance over
form was explicitly enunciated in Cole v. Fisher,163 where it held
"a contest about the form of action... [to] be of little avail to the
defendant" and left "the case to the jury, to settle it as a question
of fact, upon the principles ... [therein] stated."' 164 Similarly, it
refused in another case "to disturb . . . [a] verdict upon a
question of form only," when "upon the whole, justice ha[d]
been done between the parties."' 6 5 The sole concern of the court
had become the existence or nonexistence of a substantive right
in the plaintiff. If he had such a right or had suffered "injuries ...
or wrongs . . . in his person, property, or character," the
Massachusetts constitution provided that he "ought to find a
certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws ... .",166 Thus, if a
plaintiff had a right but could not obtain a writ conforming to the
usual forms, it was, nonetheless, "the... constant practice of the
court to grant him a writ, by which he may obtain his
1 68
remedy,"' 167 or to permit him to plead without writ.
Substance also triumphed over form in the emergence of
new rules of defensive pleading. In pre-Revolutionary law, it
will be recalled, each writ had its own proper general issue. If a
defendant pleaded the wrong general issue, his plea was held
insufficient and was rejected. By the 1790's, however, the
sufficiency of a defendant's plea was coming to depend
58SeeBigelow v.Jones, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 161, 165 (1830) (dictum).
1'59 SeeCole v. Fisher, 11 Mass. 137, 139 (1814) (by implication).
l6 01 SeeJones v. Harraden, Cushing 62, 64-65 (Suff. S.J.C. 1784).
16 SeeM'Millan v. Eastman, 4 Mass. 378,382 (1808).
162
SeeGrinnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. 530, 538 (1805) (allowing trespass as a remedy).
See also Campbell v. Phelps, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 62, 69 (1822) (dictum that Grinnell v.
Phillipswas the first instance in which trespass instead of case was held a proper remedy).
But see Campbell v. Phelps, 17 Mass. 244, 246 (1821) (holding trespass to be the sole
remedy).
16311 Mass. 137 (1814).
164Id at 139.
165 Booden v. Ellis, 7 Mass. 507,508-09 (1811).
166 MASS.CONST.pt. I, art. XI (1780).
'6 7 Cooke v. Gibbs, 3 Mass. 193, 196 (1807).
168For an example of pleading without writ, see Hubbard v. Hubbard, 6 Mass. 397
(1810). See also Ross v. Ross, [Oct. 1793] Nan. C.P. 96 (wife without writ "complain [ed]
against" her husband that he beat and threatened her, forcing her to flee).
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increasingly upon the substantive nature of the suit brought
against him, rather than upon the form of action which the
plaintiff had used. The propriety of a defensive plea, as one
lower court explained, was no longer measured by technical
rules, but "in the common scales of Justice by the weights of
Law."'' 69 Thus, if a plaintiff had a cause of action for which he
could bring one of several forms of action, it became the rule that
the defendant could plead the general issue appropriate to any of
those forms. Suits for statutory penalties are particularly
illustrative. Such suits could be brought in debt, case or trespass.
Before the Revolution a defendant was required to plead that he
was not indebted, if the plaintiff chose to bring his writ in debt;
or not guilty, if the plaintiff chose either case or trespass.
Although it remained true that not indebted was the more
proper plea, 7 ° in the late 1780's, it became the practice for
defendants to plead not guilty to writs of debt 171 as well as to
writs of case and trespass. Likewise, by the 1790's, pleas of not
guilty had become acceptable in response to writs of case172 and
debt 73 brought against executors for legacies, whereas in the
pre-Revolutionary period the plea of never promised had been
the only proper response to a writ of case, and the plea of not
indebted the proper response to a writ of debt. 74 Not indebted
also became available to executors sued in case. 17 Similarly, in
16 9

Third Parish v. Gay, [Sept. 17961 Norf. C.P. 396.
170 Stilson v. Tobey, 2 Mass. 521 (1807). One difference between the pleas was that
on a plea of not indebted the jury awarded the penalty, whereas the court did so on a plea
of not guilty. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 15 Mass. 195 (1818).
171
5ee Eddy v. Oliver, [June 1795] Linc. SJ.C. 160 (jury verdict of guilty in part);
Metcalf v. Rawson, [Feb. 1789] Suff. SJ.C. 116 (jury verdict of guilty); Davenport v.

Lamson, [Dec. 18031 Worc. C.P. 226, appeal dismissed, [Apr. 18061 Worc. SJ.C. 366

(jury verdict of not guilty); Pearley v. Bagley, [Oct. 1799] Essex C.P. 433, affd [Nov:
18001 Essex SJ.C. 332 (plea of not guilty upheld below and jury verdict of not guilty on
appeal); Thayer v. Wallack [Jan. 1791] Suff. C.P. 201, affd, Aug. 17911 Suff. S.J.C. 215
(same); Barker v. Story, [Jan. 17891 Suff. C.P. 185, appeal dismissed, [Aug. 1789] Suff.
SJ.C. 242 (plea of not guilty upheld); Winslow v. Sears, [Sept. 1787] Worc. C.P. 427,
rev'd on other ground, [Sept. 17871 Worc. S.J.C. 228 (plea of not guilty upheld below and
then waived
on appeal, where jury found defendant was indebted).
172 See Allen v. Carter, [Sept. 17921 Worc. S.J.C. 213 (jury verdict of not guilty);

Hatch v. Hatch, [July 18041 Suff. C.P. 230 (plea of not guilty upheld). But seeJoselyn v.
Hudley, [Apr. 1793] Ply. C.P. 181 (plea of not guilty rejected).
173SeeStorer v. Stowell, [July 1794] Suff. C.P. 118, affd [Aug. 17951 Suff. S.J.C. 195
(plea of not guilty upheld below; jury verdict of not indebted on appeal). Cf Holker v.
Bulfinch, [Jan. 17941 Suff. C.P. 39 (plea of never promised upheld in writ of debt).
174Compare Willard v. Flagg, [June 1774] Worc. C.P. 372 (case; plea of never
promised upheld), and Loring v. Loring, [Oct. 17721 Ply. C.P. 428 (debt; plea of not
indebted upheld), with Atkins v. Russell, [Sept. 1768] Essex C.P. 343 (case; plea of not
by law chargeable rejected), andParsons v. Kinsman, [Dec. 1774] Essex C.P. 311 (debt;
plea of5 never requested to pay rejected).
17 See Besom v. Grant, [Apr. 17941 Essex C.P. 376. Cf Wilkins v. Wilkins, [Oct.

17971 Essex C.P. 211, appeal dismissed, [June 17981 Essex SJ.C. 72 (plea of payment
upheld).
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replevin, it became permissible in the 1790's to plead, in addition
176
to the pleas appropriate to replevin, that one was not guilty.
The significance of these new rules lies in their apparent
recognition that the commission of a statutory wrong, the failure
of an executor to pay a legacy, and the wrongful taking of a
chattel constituted some generic form of wrong-a tort-for
which a plaintiff could bring a variety of different writs to obtain
damages or some other form of restitution, and concerning
which a defendant ought to have a similar election, either to
plead generically that he was not guilty of the tort or to77plead in
the form appropriate to the plaintiff's particular action.
One finds a similarly emerging substantive concept of
contract by looking at the changing rules of defensive pleading
in writs of debt, covenant and assumpsit. In pre-Revolutionary
law, each had had its own proper general issue, but by the 1790's
strict pleading rules had disappeared. Thus, it became possible to
enter the assumpsit plea of never promised to writs of
covenant 178 and debt,179 or the debt plea of not indebted to a writ
of assumpsit. 180 In one writ of assumpsit, a jury even returned a
hybrid verdict that the defendant both was indebted and had
17 6

SeeRogers v. Adams, [Aug. 18001 Ply. C.P. 128, rev'd on other grounds, [June 1801]
Ply. S.J.C. 104 (plea of not guilty upheld below; jury verdict that defendant took goods
on appeal); Howe v. Symmes, [Apr. 1799] Suff. C.P. 89, rev'd on other grounds, [Feb. 1800]

Suff. SJ.C. 18 (plea of not guilty upheld below; jury verdict of property in plaintiff on
appeal); Soul v. Winthrop, Iuly 1793] Suff. C.P. 162, affd [Aug. 1793] Suff. SJ.C. 201
(plea of not guilty upheld below; jury verdict of property in defendants on appeal).
177Defendants retained the right to plead to the specific form of action. See Miller v.
Hartshorne, [Feb. 17991 Suff. SJ.C. 119 (jury verdict in replevin that property not in
plaintiff); Kirkwood v. Prout, [June 17931 Cumb. S.J.C. 116 (jury verdict in writ of debt
that defendant indebted); Butman v. Hutson, [June 1792] Essex S.J.C. 125 (jury verdict
in replevin that property not in third person as alleged by defendant); Benson v. Bell,
[Jan. 1806] Suff. C.P. 500 (plea in replevin of never took upheld); Rice v. Brigham,
[Aug. 1800] Worc. C.P. 385, appealdismissed, [Sept. 1800] Worc. SJ.C. 527 (jury verdict
of not guilty in writ of case for statutory penalty); Dutch v. Mighill, [Apr. 1799] Essex
C.P. 169, appealdismissed,[June 17991 Essex S.J.C. 189 (plea of never promised upheld in
writ of case against executor); Townsend v. Fayerweather, [Mar. 1799] Msex. C.P. 109,
rev'don
178 default [Apr. 1801] Msex. SJ.C. 15 (same).
SeeWinsor v. Rich, [Oct. 1810] Ply. S.J.C. 21; Stearns v. Barrett, [Oct. 1821] Suff.
C.P. 32; Peck v.Jackson, [Oct. 1799] Suff. C.P. 227, appeal dismissed, [Aug. 1800] Suff.
SJ.C. 79; Winsor v. Edes, [Apr. 17991 Ply. C.P. 486; Vaughan v. Woods, [July 17981
Suff. C.P. 322, rev'd by referees, [Feb. 1799] Suff. SJ.C. 141; Wady v. Tallman, [Mar.
1792]79Bris. C.P. 80.
1 See Kent v. Woodward, [Jan. 1804] Suff. C.P. 1; Sullivan v. Blake, [Jan. 1800]
Suff. C.P. 85, rev'don defaul [Aug. 1800] Suff. SJ.C. 76. Cf Pynes v. Allen, [Apr. 1814]
Ply. C.P. 396, appealdismissed, [Oct. 18141 Ply. SJ.C. 76 (plea of never promised upheld
in action
of account).
180SeeFrothingham v. Soley, [Jan. 1799] Suff. C.P. 164, appeal dismissed, [Feb. 1800]
Suff. SJ.C. 40; Coffin v. Folger, [Mar. 1797] Nan. C.P. 173; Bordman v. Stewart, [Oct.
1791] Suff. C.P. 64, rev'd on defaul [Feb. 1792] Suff. SJ.C. 18; Moore v. Titcomb, [Apr.
1788] Essex C.P. 335; Rogerson v. Howard, [Jan. 1788] Suff. C.P. 51; Winslow v.
Pitcher, [Apr. 1782] Ply. C.P. 327. Cf Devens v. Bryant, [Jan. 1789] Suff. C.P. 213, rev'd
on defaul [Feb. 1789] Suff. SJ.C. 146 (plea of non est factum upheld).
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promised,' 81 while in one plea of covenant, the court upheld a
plea that the defendant never covenanted182 -an adaptation to
the writ of covenant of the assumpsit plea of never promised. In
these cases, in short, the ancient categories of debt, covenant and
assumpsit were being blurred, and a new category of contract,
under which lawyers were83seeking to subsume the entire law of
obligation, was emerging.

One way in which lawyers sought to place all of the law of
obligation within the catagory of contract was by transposing the
doctrine of consideration into two sorts of action where proof
thereof had not previously been required-suits on negotiable
and on sealed instruments. As a result, by the beginning of the
nineteenth century in a suit by the original promissee, the maker
in his defense evidence not
of a promissory note could introduce
185
184
failure of consideration,
a
or
consideration
illegal
an
of
only
but even of a want of consideration in the original transaction,
which would render the note "void as a nudum pactum.' 186 These
18 1
SeeAlden
82

v. Milikan, tJune 1793] Cumb. SJ.C. 164.

183SeeQuincy v. Shaw, [July 1795] Suff. C.P. 64.
' Apparently, however, there existed some recognition during the 1790's of
subcategories within the general category of contract. In particular, it appears that debt,
covenant and indebitatus assumpsit were regarded as one subcategory distinct from
another, special assumpsit. Thus, pleas of not guilty became proper in writs of debt, see
Lindsey v. House, [Apr. 18001 Ply. C.P. 83, appeal dismissed, [une 18011 Ply. SJ.C. 99;
Storer v. Stowell, [July 1794] Suff. C.P. 118, affd, [Aug. 1795] Suff. SJ.C. 195 (plea of
not guilty upheld below; jury verdict of not defendant's deed on appeal); covenant, see
Drew v. Edes, [Apr. 18011 Ply. C.P. 224, appeal dismissed [June 18011 Ply. SJ.C. 106;
Bolter v. Proprietors of Hay Market Theater, [Apr. 17981 Suff. C.P. 41, appealdismissed,
[Feb. 1799] Suff. SJ.C. 150; Smith v. Knoepsel, [July 17971 Suff. C.P. 147, affd, [Feb.
17981 Suff. SJ.C. 5 (plea of not guilty upheld below; special verdict on appeal); Villiers
v.Tyler, [July 17951 Suff. C.P. 150; Shaw v.Jackson, [July 1795] Suff. C.P. 65, affd,
[Aug. 17961 Suff. SJ.C. 208 (plea of not guilty upheld below;jury verdict of did not keep
covenant on appeal); Beals v. Barrow, [Aug. 17911 Suff. SJ.C. 224 (jury verdict of
guilty); and indebitatus assumpsit, see Barnard v. Hulbert, [Jan. 1803] Berk. C.P., appeal
dismissed,[May 1804] Berk. SJ.C. 204; Walter v. Guppy, [July 1799] Suff. C.P. 151, rev'd
by referees, [Feb. 1800] Suff. SJ.C. 34; Endicot v. Sumner, [July 1789] Suff. C.P. 86, affd,
[Feb. 17901 Suff. SJ.C. 27 (plea of not guilty upheld below; jury verdict of never
promised on appeal). Where no promise on the part of the defendant needed to be proved
by the plaintiff, a plea of never promised would have been inappropriate on the facts.
Pleas of not guilty were throughout the 1790's held inappropriate upon writs of special
assumpsit, see Frothingham v. Patten, [Jan. 1794] Suff. C.P. 16; Storer v. Wilder, [Jan.
1793] Suff. C.P. 43; Read v. Shearman, [Mar. 1791] Bris. C.P. 43, where a promise on
the part of the defendant did have to be proved by the plaintiff and a plea of never
promised
was therefore appropriate.
184SeeWheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 258, 281 (1821); Russell v. De Grand, 15 Mass.
Allen v. Shearman, [Dec. 1807] Bris. C.P. 640.
35 (1818);
18 5
SeeKnapp v. Lee, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 452,457 (1826).
' 86Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 14, 22 (1810). Accord, Boutell v. Cowdin, 9 Mass. 254
(1812); Bliss v. Negus, 8 Mass. 46 (1811). See also Hill v. Buckminster, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.)
391 (1827) (note given in renewal of a note which was void for want of consideration is
also void); Whitcomb v. Williams, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 228 (1826) (permitting a maker of
a note who failed to make a defense of want of consideration in a suit on the note to
maintain a new suit to recover back the money paid on the note). Contra, Stackpole v.
Arnold, IIMass. 27, 32 (1814).
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cases led, in turn, to a reversal of the colonial rule 187 that a
plaintiff in a suit upon a note did not have to plead and prove
consideration; an 1827 case clearly held that he did. 188 For abrief
time near the turn of the century, the courts even held that a
defense "that there was no Cons. for the Note" could "be gone
into" in a suit by an endorsee against a maker, 189 although
ultimately they rejected such a rule in response to the needs of
the commercial community, which used negotiable securities as
"a substitute for money" and "a circulating medium." 190 By
1830, the courts had arrived at the modern view that a maker
cannot go into the defense of consideration in a suit by the
endorsee, unless the endorsee obtained the note after maturity or
otherwise did not fulfill the requirements of being a holder in
191
due course.
Similar efforts were made by defendants in suits upon sealed
instruments to go into questions of consideration. One lower
court in 1800, for example, held a bond under seal void because
it had been given for an illegal consideration, 192 while several
years earlier Theophilus Parsons, who would subsequently
become Chief Justice of Massachusetts, had argued that a
"covent: ...[was] void for want of Cons." 193 There were at least
two categories of cases in which the courts accepted Parsons'
argument and permitted defendants to impeach a sealed
instrument for want of consideration: cases of covenants not to
compete, 194 and cases in which a receipt of consideration was not
averred in the deed sued on by the plaintiff.195 Moreover, as late
as the 1820's, the Supreme Judicial Court was "not prepared to
say" whether "a failure of consideration . . . [would] avoid a

deed." 196 But by 1810, after a decade of confusion, it had become
18 7
SeeW.
88

Nelson, supranote 63, at 97-98.
1 SeeHemmenway v. Hickes, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 497,500 (1827).
89
1 Micah v. Clap, (Hamp. S.J.C. 1792), in Dana, supra note 97. See also Lyman v.
Leavitt, (Hamp. SJ.C. 1799), in Dana, supra note 97 (defendant maker of a promissory

note argued that "the want of such Cons. prevent[ed] the Indorsee the Pit: from
recovering in this Action").
0
19
Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162, 191 (1811).
191See Grew v. Burditt, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 265 (1830); Bartlett v. Skinner, [Aug.
1830192Worc. C.P. 403.
1 Page v. Trufant, [Sept. 1800] Msex. C.P. 257.
193Parker v. Mather, (Msex. SJ.C. 1792), in Dana, supranote 97.
194See Pierce v. Woodward, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 206 (1828); Palmer v. Stebbins, 20
Mass. (3 Pick.) 188, 193 (1825); Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522, 530 (1813); Pierce v.
Fuller, 8 Mass. 223, 226 (1811).
195
Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. 162, 186-89 (1811); see Davenport v. Mason, 15
Mass. 85, 91-92 (1818), overruled on other grounds,Jacobs v. Peterborough & Shirley R.R.
Co., 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 223 (1851).
196Stearns v. Barrett, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 443,448-49 (1823).
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clear that, except in the special categories noted above, a total
want, as distinguished from a failure of consideration, would not
avoid a deed. In the words of the court, a "covenant . .. ,
although voluntary and gratuitous on the part of [its makers,
would] yet [be] binding on them ....
, 19 7
Even in reaching this result, however, the courts came to
analyze sealed contracts under the broader, more general rubric
of contract. The rule at which they arrived in covenant cases, for
instance, was not that consideration was not a requisite of sealed
as well as unsealed contracts, but that proof of consideration was
not needed in the former case, because "[a] bond, from the
198
solemnity of its execution, import[ed]

a consideration.''

Accordingly, one could not impeach the bond for a want of
consideration, although one could "avoid the bond, by shewing
that it was obtained by fraud or duress, or that the consideration
[was] illegal or against the policy of the law."' 99 Perhaps one
could also show that the consideration had failedY Moreover,
although the courts refused to permit a defense of want of
consideration in suits on sealed instruments, they did treat sealed
contracts like other contracts in several other ways. One was to
apply the same measure of damage in covenant as in
assumpsit; 20 1 another was to hold that a contract under seal, like
any other contract, could be discharged by a new parol
agreement 20 2 for which a consideration
deemed by the parties to
203
given.
been
had
adequate
be full and
The breakdown of the old formulary categories and the
emergence of new substantive ones can also be seen by studying
pleas offered in defense to cases on the borderline between the
newly emerging categories of tort and contract. By the 1790's,
for example, a defendant had the option, in suits against sheriffs
for their own or their deputies' misfeasance; 20 4 in suits against
19 7Upham v. Smith, 7 Mass. 265, 266 (1811); accord Mitchell v. Kingman, 22 Mass.
(5 Pick.) 431, 433 (1827) (by implication).
19 8Page v. Trufant, 2 Mass. 159, 162 (1806) (opinion of Parsons, Cj.).
191d at 162.
20
°Seenote 194 supra & accompanying text.
20 1
See Harris v. Newell, 8 Mass. 262 (1811); Caswell v. Wendell, 4 Mass. 108, 110
(1808); Bickford v. Page, 2 Mass. 455, 461 (1807); Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433, 440

(1807).
2 2

° Munroe v. Perkins, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 298, 303-05 (1830); see Randall v. Rich, 11
Mass. 494 (1814). See also Bacon v. Kingman, [Sept. 1783] Berk. C.P. 57 (new agreement
pleaded
in protestando,but plea never brought to issue).
2 03

Howe v. Mackay, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 44,50 (1827).
'SeePepoon v. Porter, [Sept. 1795] Hamp. SJ.C. 235 (jury verdict that deputy not
guilty); Greenleaf v. Sibley, [Apr. 1792] Worc. SJ.C. 46 (jury verdict that deputy
20

guilty); Brown v. Henderson, [Feb. 1792] Suff. SJ.C. 19 (jury verdict that deputy guilty
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bailees for negligent treatment of or failure to return the
plaintiff's goods; 20 5 and in suits for fraud or breach of warranty, 20 6 of pleading either not guilty or never promised. A
defendant could, that is, treat an action either as one in tort or as
one in contract whenever the nature of the suit was unclear.
Similarly, if a writ, such as assumpsit, to which never promised
was the proper general issue, were brought upon a cause of
action, such as breach of promise to marry, to which the tort
issue of not guilty was the proper response, the tort issue had to
be pleaded.20 7 Courts, in short, no longer thought in terms of
specific pleas as answers to specific writs; rather they thought in
terms of the underlying nature of the cause of action and,
defendants to plead in an appropriately
accordingly, required
20 8
responsive manner.

of neglect of duty); Hurd v. Henderson, [Feb. 1788] Suff. S.J.C. 329 (jury verdict that
deputy guilty in part); Hills v. Baldwin, [Oct. 1787] Msex. SJ.C. 285 (jury verdict that
deputy guilty); Brown v. Hyde, [Oct. 17851 Berk. SJ.C. 19" (jury verdict of not guilty
on writ of case against sheriff which included allegation that the sheriff had promised to
serve an execution); Brooks v. Burroughs, [Jan. 17991 Suff. C.P. 182 (plea of never
promised upheld); Sloane v. Henderson, [Oct. 1791] Suff. C.P. 72 (plea that sheriff not
liable205for deputy's promises and that deputy never promised upheld).
See Wood v. Wood, [Nov. 18081 Suff. SJ.C. 15 (jury verdict that defendant
promised); Child v. Merry, [Feb. 1799] Suff. SJ.C. 117 (same); Fisk v. Caldwell, [Apr.
17981 Worc. SJ.C. 99 (jury verdict of guilty); Niles v. Prince, [Feb. 1794] Suff. S.J.C. 11
(jury verdict that defendant promised); Hulbert v. Houghton, [Aug. 1815] Frank. C.P.
30 (jury verdict of not guilty upon plea of never promised); Pinkham v. Griffin, [July
1807] Suff. C.P. 442 (jury verdict of not guilty); Pope v. Godshall, [June 1805] Essex
C.P. 158 (plea of never promised upheld); Cushing v. Davis, [Mar. 1805].Essex C.P. 70,
appealdismissed, [Apr. 18051 Essex S.J.C. 388 (plea of not guilty upheld); Niles v. Capt,
[Oct. 1796] Suff. C.P. 206, appealdismissed,[Feb. 1797] Suff. SJ.C. 18 (pleaofnot guilty
Evans v. Linkon, [Dec. 17841 Bris. C.P. 431 (jury verdict on plea of not guilty).
upheld);
2
°6Wilson v. Dunlap, [June 1797] Essex SJ.C. 139 (jury verdict of not guilty); Steel
v. Billings, [Oct. 1795] Berk. SJ.C. 255 (same); Webb v. Cross, [June 17951 Cumb.
S.J.C. 145 (jury verdict of guilty); Gray v. Bordman, [Feb. 1795] Suff. SJ.C. 10 (jury
verdict of not guilty); Smith v. Whitney, [Aug. 1824] Hampd. C.P. 23 (jury verdict that
defendant promised); Briggs v. Atwood, [Nov. 1807] Ply. C.P. 59 (jury verdict of
guilty); Denny v. March, [Sept. 1805] Worc. C.P. 269, appeal dismissed, [Sept. 1806]
Worc. SJ.C. 409 (jury verdict of not guilty); Newhall v. Eaton, [Apr. 1805] Bris. C.P.
200, appeal dismissed, [Oct. 1806] Bris. SJ.C. 380 (same); Fennelly v. Lee, [Jan. 1805]
Suff. C.P. 126, rev'd on defaul4 [Nov. 1806] Suff. SJ.C. 244 (plea of never promised
upheld); Martins v. Walter, [Jan. 18051 Suff. C.P. 57, appealdismissed, [Nov. 1806] Suff.
SJ.C. 202 (plea of not guilty upheld); Welsh v. Gridley, [Oct. 1799] Suff. C.P. 287,
appealdismissed,[Aug. 1801] Suff. SJ.C. 167 (plea of never promised upheld); Vernon v.
Gay, [Oct. 1797] Suff. C.P. 245, appeal dismissed, [Feb. 1799] Suff. SJ.C. 113 (same);
Foster v. Pope, [Sept. 1797] Berk. C.P. 343, appeal dismissed,[Oct. 1799] Berk. SJ.C. 239
(jury verdict of guilty); Train v. Henshaw, [Dec. 1783] Worc. C.P. 294 (jury verdict of
not guilty).
2°TSee Ferre v. Wallis, [Nov. 1808] Hamp. C.P. 272, appeal dismissed, [Apr. 1810]
Hamp. SJ.C. 205; Wells v. Chase, [June 1804] Essex C.P. 224; Twiss v. Perry, [Sept.
1785120 Essex C.P. 345, appeal dismissed, [June 1786] Essex SJ.C. 243.
8For other examples of pleas to suits on the borderline between tort and contract,
see Hurd v. Silk, [May 1792] Barns. SJ.C. 100 (jury verdict of guilty upon a writ of case
for defendant's failure to pay plaintiff wages due for hiring of his servant); Tufts v.
Apthorp, [Feb. 1788] Suff. S.J.C. 324 (jury verdict that defendant never promised upon
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Emerging concepts of tort and contract also caused the
development of other pleading rules, such as the rule that counts
in tort and contract could not be joined;20 9 that joint victims of a
single act of misfeasance could not join their claims in tort,
although joint promisees could join claims in contract; 2 10 and
that joint tortfeasors could plead separately in defense, while
2 11
joint promisors could not.
Concepts of tort and contract were not, of course, entirely
new in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts; the pre-Revolutionary records had contained occasional references to them. 212 What
was new in the post-Revolutionary period was the emphasis on
substarrce over form and the rejection of British forms-that is,
the writ system-as an intellectually acceptable mode of thinking
about law. Once the old formulary categories had been rejected,
new categories had to replace them, and Massachusetts lawyers
turned to substantive categories, to which they adapted the
ancient forms of action and their ancient defenses. That
adaptation was, however, but a single step along the path from
common law pleading to the modern Massachusetts variant of
code pleading.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A UNITARY

DEFENSIVE PLEA
The next step in the reform of common law pleading was the
development during the first two decades of the nineteenth
century of a unitary defensive plea under which a defendant
could introduce whatever facts constituted a defense on the
merits to the plaintiff's cause of action. A part of this
development was the recognition that the particular varieties of
writ of case for breach of promise made by defendant's agent); Abrahams v. Hays, [June
1787] Linc. SJ.C. 162 (jury verdict of not guilty upon writ of case for failure of broker to
deliver insurance policy to plaintiff); Maccarty v. Fifth Mass. Tpke. Corp., [Mar. 1805]
Worc. C.P. 79, appeal dismissed, [Sept. 1805] Worc. SJ.C. 353 (plea of not guilty upheld
upon writ of case for defect in turnpike encountered after paying toll); Thomas v. Lunt,
[Sept. 1785] Essex C.P. 313 (jury verdict of guilty in plea of case alleging negligence on
part of defendant contrary to his promise). See also Hill v. Inhabitants of Shutesbury,
May 1786] Hamp. SJ.C. 190 (jury verdict that defendant not guilty but did promise
upon2 writ
of case by minister for salary).
° 9White v. Snell, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 425,427 (1827). But seeRemick v. Wyatt, [Dec.
1813] Essex C.P. 257 (denying motion to arrest judgment for improper joinder of tort
and contract).
21
°Baker v.Jewell, 6 Mass. 460,462 (1810).
211
Meagher v. Bachelder, 6 Mass. 444 (1810). On joinder of parties generally, see

note 2 101
supra
12
SeeW. Nelson, supra note 63, at 129 n.165.
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the general issue appropriate to particular actions were mere
matters of form and that a plea of the wrong general issue was, as
a general rule, immaterial. Thus, in the courts of common pleas,
where litigation as to the propriety of a particular general issue
was usually a matter solely of which party would be appellant
and which party respondent in proceedings in the Supreme
Judicial Court, judges began around 1800 to regard pleas of the
general issue as purely fictitious and to determine on a basis not
disclosed in the records2 13 which party would have to take the
appeal. This development can be seen first in the courts'
upholding of unusual pleas-pleas, for example, of never
promised to a writ of trover for conversion 214 or to a writ of debt
for a statutory penalty; 215 of not the defendant's act and deed to2 16
a
writ of ejectment in which the plaintiff claimed under a deed;
of never accepted to a writ of case against an alleged acceptor of
a bill of exchange; 2 17 and of "he is not answerable" to a writ of
case against a sheriff who wrongfully released property taken on
an attachment. 218 It

can be observed subsequently in

the

inconsistency with which courts dealt with pleas of never
promised 219 and not guilty 220 made in response to writs of

assumpsit; and, finally, in the ultimate result achieved in the
1810's, when litigants could simply agree without a plea on the
part of the
defendant to appeal the case to the Supreme Judicial
1
22

Court.
2 13

ButseeVanSchaack v. Watson, [Jan. 1812] Hamp. C.P. 131, appealdismissed, [Apr.
1812]2 14Hamp. S.J.C. 303 (defendant's plea rejected because interposed only for delay).
See Hayward v. Weston, [Apr. 1802] Ply. C.P. 372, appealdismissed, [June 18031
Ply. 2SJ.C.
169.
1
. SeeHinds v. Raymond, [Nov. 18001 Ply. C.P. 161, appeal dismissed, [June 1801]
Ply. 2SJ.C.
108.
1
SeeHussey v. Coffin, [Oct. 1796] Nan. C.P. 118.
2 17
See Barnes v. Peck, [July 1810] Suff. C.P. 72, rev'd on other rounds, [Nov. 1810]
Suff.2 18
SJ.C. 200 (jury verdict on appeal that defendant did promise .
-See Sewall v. Mattoon, [Oct. 18111 Suff. C.P. 385, rev'd on default, [Mar. 18131
Suff. S:J.C. 142.
21-Compare, e.g., Goodwin v. Woodbridge, [Sept. 1797] Berk. C.P. 432 (plea of never
promised rejected), with Allen v. Lathrop, [July 1805] Suff. C.P. 211, rev'd on default,
Nov. 18061 Suff. S.J.C. 341 (plea of never promised upheld).
220 Compare Hutchins v. Low, [Apr. 1817] butt. C.P. 290; Jenkins v. Hanley, [Jan.
1803] Berk. C.P. 207, appeal dismissed, [May 1803] Berk. SJ.C. 165 (pleas of not guilty
rejected), with Phelps v. Adams, [Mar. 18141 Essex C.P. 55, appealdismissed,[Nov. 1814!
Essex S.J.C. 106; Bond v. Blackmore, [Apr. 1808] Suff. C.P. 336; Brown v. Spaulding,
[Oct. 1807] Suff. C.P. 25; Farrar v. King, [Mar. 1807] Worc. C.P. 434, appeal dismissed,
[Apr. 1807] Worc. SJ.C. 429; Wendell v. McMullen, [Oct. 1806] Suff. C.P. 172, appeal
dismissed, [Nov. 1806] Suff. SJ.C. 712; Scott v. Hodge, [Oct. 1805] Suff. C.P. 538;
Dwight v. Webster, [Sept. 1797] Berk. C.P. 2, affd, [Oct. 1797] Berk. SJ.C. 48 (pleas of
not guilty
upheld).
22
1See Griffin v. Brown, [Oct. 1822] Berk. C.P. 360, affd, [May 1826] Berk. SJ.C.
330. See also Parker v. Thompson, [Oct. 1824] Suff. C.P. 279, rev'd on other grounds, [Mar.
1825] Suff. SJ.C. 177; Davis v. Winegar, [Feb. 18211 Berk. C.P. 191, affd, [Sept. 1824]
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Incorrect pleas of the general issue also came to be treated as
harmless formal errors even when they formed the basis of ajury
verdict. It appears, for example, that as early as the 1780's a plea
of an incorrect general issue would be cured by the jury's return
of a verdict upon the proper issue. 222 The basic rule was that
defects of form caused by a failure to adhere to "the strict rules of
pleading" could be objected to only upon demurrer and that an
"objection ... [after a verdict came] too late. ' 223 Later, in the
early years of the nineteenth century, the courts also arrived at a
rule that an informal verdict rendered upon proper pleadings
would not be permitted to affect the outcome of the litigation.
When "[tihe only error or mistake arose from a mere slip in
drawing up the verdict... ," that slip "clearly... ought not to be
allowed to vacate the judgment." 224 Even when both the
pleadings and the verdict were technically informal, a court
might render judgment on the verdict, 225 particularly if the
losing party had been at fault in causing the informality.226 The
procedure in such a case would be for the court to read the
verdict to the jury in proper form and, if the jurors unanimously
Berk. SJ.C. 211; Marsh v. Gold, [Feb. 1821] Berk. C.P. 1, affd, [May 1824] Berk. SJ.C.
86; Perkins v. Wetherell, [Aug. 18141 Ply. C.P. 21, affd, [Oct. 1814] Ply. SJ.C. 72;
Curtis v. Curtis, [Dec. 18121 Norf. C.P. 492, appeal dismissed, [Oct. 1814] Norf. SJ.C.
515; Windsor v. Rich, [Apr. 1810] Ply. C.P. 44, aff'd, [Oct. 1810] Ply. SJ.C. 21. Cf
Chapman v. Eldredge, [Feb. 18261 Berk. C.P. 74, modified, [Sept. 1825] Berk. SJ.C. 273
(parties
agree without joining issue on merits that jury may assess damages).
2 22
See Briggs v. Braley, [Aug. 1828] Ply. C.P. 69, rev'd on defaul4 [May 1830] Ply.
SJ.C. 407 (jury verdict of guilty in case for defamation upon plea that defendant "is not
of the premises"); Sunkes v. Russell, [Oct. 18271 Suff. C.P. 177 (jury verdict in
assumpsit that defendant promised upon plea of not guilty); Fellows v. Dwight, [Feb.
1791] Berk. C.P. 441 (jury verdict in assumpsit that defendant never promised upon plea
of not guilty); Warner v. Gustine, [Feb. 1783] Hamp. C.P. 111 (jury verdict in
indebitatus assumpsit that defendant never promised upon a plea of not guilty); Warner
v. Gustine, [Nov. 1782] Hamp. C.P. 106 (same case). But see Gerrish v. Train, [Jan. 18251
Suff. C.P. 29, appeal dismissed, [Mar. 18271 Suff. SJ.C. 186 (jury verdict of not guilty
upon2 23
immaterial issue in trespass rejected).
Wheeler v. Train, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 255,258 (1825). SeeWilliams v. Woodman,
25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 78 (1829) (joining issue upon informal plea constitutes waiver of any
objection as to its form); Whiting v. Cochran, 9 Mass. 532 (1813) (appearance, defense
and jury verdict on issue tendered by plaintiff cures defendant's failure to join therein)
(dictum). Cf Barnard v. Whiting, 7 Mass. 358 (1811) (jury verdict upon good count in
plaintiff's declaration cures defective count for same cause of action); Patten v. Gurney,
17 Mass.
182, 187 (1821) (same).
224
CIark v. Lamb, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 415,418 (1829). Accord, Porter v. Rummery, 10
Mass. 64, 66 (1813); McMasters v. Parsons, [June 1794] Essex SJ.C. 112 (verdict "in
favor of the Plaintiffs"); Wilbur v. Reed, [June 1829] Bris. C.P. 118 (verdict for plaintiff
which failed to award damages upon plea of tender); Wilbour v. Howard, [Sept. 1826]
Bris. C.P. 176 (verdict in assumpsit of not guilty upon a plea of never promised); Hakes
v. Hubbell, [Oct. 1822] Berk. C.P. 353, affd, [Sept. 18231 Berk. SJ.C. 53 (verdict in case
for defamation that defendant indebted upon plea of not guilty).
225SeeRussell v. Kinney, [Dec. 1821] Bris. C.P. 30 (verdict in assumpsit of not guilty
upon2 plea of not guilty); Lowden v. Lowden, [Nov. 1807] Ply. C.P. 58 (same).
6SeeEaton v. Stone, 7 Mass. 312, 314 (1811).
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agreed to that verdict, the court would then "authorize it to be
recorded. 2 27 The court would not render judgment, however, if
the pleadings were so defective
that the court was at a loss as to
228
what judgment to render.

The general issue was not the only defensive plea to
undergo modification during the closing years of the eighteenth
and opening years of the nineteenth century; the rules for special
pleading were also modified. First, a series of statutes in the last
two decades of the eighteenth ceritury gave liberty to specified
categories of defendants to plead the general issue and to put
special matter in evidence thereunder. These laws applied to all
defendants in actions before justices of the peace except suits
involving title to land; 229 executors, administrators and guardians;230 and justices of the peace, sheriffs and other local

officials. 23' These statutes sought to assist these defendants in
avoiding the vagaries of special pleading. 232 Judicially-created
rules offered similar assistance to other defendants. One rule
permitted a defendant upon a plea of the general issue to reserve
with the plaintiff's consent the right to put special matters in

evidence.233 A second practice-pleading double-permitted 234a
a plea of the general issue,

defendant to join a special plea to
even if the two pleas were inconsistent. 23 1 Since the general issue
2 27

Ropps v. Barker, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 239,242 (1826).

228

SeeGerrish v. Train, 20 Mass. (3Pick.) 124, 127 (1825); Newburyport v. Adams,
[June 1785] Essex SJ.C. 239 (verdict failed to disclose land taken for road so that
damages could not be determined).
229Act of Mar. 11, 1784, §§ 2, 77, 1 [1784-1807] Mass. Laws 146, 147, 149, construed,
Waters v. Lilley, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 145 (1826). For the general rule that a defendant
could not introduce matters involving title to land into evidence in trespass actions
commenced before justices of the peace, see Lynch v. Rossetter, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 419
(1828).
230
Act of Mar. 10, 1784, § 9, 1 [1784-1807] Mass. Laws 134, 137, construed Foster v.
Abbott,
231 1 Mass. 234 (1804).
Act of Feb. 25, 1793, 2 [1784-1807] Mass. Laws 560, construed, Bangs v. Snow, 1
Mass. 181 (1804). This statute was also applied in Stearns v. Merwin, [Nov. 1826]
Hampd. C.P. 8; Drake v. Hewins, [Feb. 1819] Norf. S.J.C. 17; Whipple v. Chamberlain,
[Oct.2321815] Suff. C.P. 207; Lamson v. Calley, [Dec. 18131 Essex C.P. 424.
SeeHowe Lectures, supranote 105, at 181-82.
233
See Pierre v. McCrellis, [Apr. 1800] Hampd. SJ.C. 256; Hall v. Fletcher, [Sept.
1792] Msex. C.P. 39. But see Kellogg v. Ingersoll, I Mass. 5 (1804) (special matter not
allowed
234 in evidence under plea of non est factum to writ of covenant).
Merry v. Gay, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 388 (1826); see Baker v. Prescott, [Mar. 1826]
Suff. SJ.C. 66; Sanderson v. Henderson, [Feb. 1792] Suff. SJ.C. 6; Breed v. Hurd, [Oct.
1827] Suff. C.P. 122, rev'd on other grounds, [Mar. 1828] Suff. SJ.C. 105; Stratton v.
Whitney, [Sept. 1816] Worc. C.P. 322; Raymond v. Braman, [Sept. 1805] Bris. C.P. 242,
appeal dismissed, [Oct. 1806] Bris. SJ.C. 380. But see Martin v. Woods, 6 Mass. 6 (1809)
(defendant may not plead in special plea a fact which he must already prove under
general issue to which special plea is joined); DeLuce v. DeGuiscard, [Aug. 1783] Stiff.
SJ.C. 154 (motion in writ of case for defamation for leave to plead general issue and
special
235justification overruled).
Merry v. Gay, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 388,389 (1826).
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would always be a sufficient defense, a defendant, by joining a
special plea to it, obtained the benefits of the special plea without
undergoing the risk of being thrown out of court as a result of a
formal, technical error in it. Although theoretically a matter of
discretion, "leave to plead double [was] granted almost as a
matter of course, & without much consideration .... ,,236
Moreover, in cases where a special plea was joined to the general
issue, juries usually returned, and the courts then rendered
judgment upon, a verdict which decided only the general
issue. 237 The courts reasoned that the jury could not have
decided the general issue without implicitly deciding the special
issue as well.238 In short, special pleas were completely ignored,
except to give defendants who joined special to their general
pleas the right to put special matter in evidence under the
general issue. Special pleading was virtually abolished. Old rules
of special pleading survived only where defendants pleaded
239
specially without simultaneously pleading the general issue.
236 Howe
2 37

Lectures, supranote 105, at 141.
See Hildreth v. Winslow, [Apr. 17901 Worc. S.J.C. 74; Chase v. Patterson, [June
17881 York SJ.C. 418; Wood v. Stevens, [June 17861 Cumb. SJ.C. 280; Wood v.
Hinckley, [July 18211 Suff. C.P. 50, affd, [Nov. 18211 Suff. SJ.C. 214; McElwain v.
Lyon, [Aug. 1801] Hampd. C.P. 116; Freeman v. Norman, [july 1785] Suff. C.P. 40,
rev'd23on8 default [Feb. 17861 Suff. SJ.C. 42; Howe Lectures, supranote 105, at 199-200.
Hodges v. Raymond, 9 Mass. 316 (1812).
2
39A basic rule of special pleading which so survived was that a defendant could not
lead specially facts which merely "amounted to the general issue"-that is, "facts
whichl would be proper evidence under [such an issue]." Town of Freeport v. Town of
Edgecumbe, 1 Mass. 459, 462 (1805). Accord, Ely v. Granger, [Sept. 17941 Hampd. C.P.
293. Since in most writs "the defendant may give in evidence under the general issue any
matter that contradicts the allegations which the plaintiff is bound to prove," a defendant
had to plead specially "matters of excuse or justification" and other special defenses.
Rawson v. Morse, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 127 (1826). For examples of matters which were
admissible under the general issue and hence could not be pleaded specially, see Poor v.
Robinson, 10 Mass. 131, 134 (1813) (all evidence with exception of collateral warranty
in writ of right); Proprietors of Monumoi Great Beach v. Rogers, 1 Mass. 159, 160
(1804) (dictum) (evidence of title in trespass q.c.f); Hayward v. Parris, [Nov. 1799] Ply.
C.P. 6 (evidence in assumpsit that contract never made); Campbell v.Jones, [May 1779]
Hampd. C.P. 236 (same); Boardman v. Barton, [Jan. 17931 Suff. C.P. 45 (evidence in
trespass for assault that defendant did not wound plaintiff); Waitt v. Clap, [Sept. 1788]
Essex C.P. 87 (evidence of fraud in endorsement of note). For examples of matters which
were not admissible under the general issue and hence could be pleaded specially, see
Wolcott v. Knight, 6 Mass. 418, 420 (1810) (evidence of conveyance by ancestor of
demandant after disseisin not admissible under general issue in entry); Pray v. Pierce, 7
Mass. 381, 383 (1811) (evidence that defendant is not freehold tenant); Kelleran v.
Brown, 4 Mass. 443, 444 (1808) (same); M'Farland v. Barker, 1 Mass. 153 (1804)
(special matter in justification not admissible under general issue in replevin); Noble v.
Talcot, [Oct. 1796] Berk. S.J.C. 265 (payment, discharge, or accord and satisfaction);
Padelford v. Cobb, [May 1790] Ply. SJ.C. 100 (same); Weld v. Needham, [Nov. 1809]
Hampd. C.P. 321, appeal dismissed, [Apr. 18101 Hampd. SJ.C. 214 (same); Parry v.
Daman, [Jan. 1806] Suff. C.P. 55 (same); Parker v. Grout, [Oct. 1800] Suff. C.P. 58
(same); Allen v. Minot, [July 17901 Suff. C.P. 21 (same); Saltmarsh v. Willington, [Sept.
1787] Essex C.P. 213 (same); VanDusen v. Williams, [Sept. 17841 Berk. C.P. 456

j
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THE TRANSFORMATION
TO NOTICE PLEADING

During the first third of the nineteenth century, then, the
rules of pleading were transformed. In cases in which the
common law system proved constraining, litigants were no
longer held to its constraints but were able to bend the system to
fit the needs of their case. If a plaintiff had a just claim or a
defendant a just defense, technical rules of pleading would no
longer be interposed to prevent adjudication on the merits.
Pleadings no longer had to adhere to the ancient forms; the only
requirement of a pleading was that it give "notice to the
opposing party, of matters intended to be given in evidence by
either party to a suit, as shall be necessary to prevent surprise,
and to afford opportunity for preparation for trial,"24 for a party
could "not be supposed to come prepared to defend against any
cause of action [or defense], of which he ha[d]241no notice in the
declaration" or in the plea in response thereto.
The courts had thus travelled most of the distance toward a
system of notice pleading by 1830, and the legislature soon
thereafter intervened and completed the task by statutes enacted
in 1836 and 1851. The 1851 act, which was the result of study by
a commission of eminent lawyers appointed within a year of the
enactment of the Field Code in New York,242 was the
Massachusetts alternative to a code.243 Like the Field Code, the
1851 act formally abolished the individual common law writs in
personal actions, but it did not substitute a single, unitary cause
of action for them. Instead it created generic pleas of contract,
(same); Bates v. Googins, [Nov. 17921 Essex SJ.C. 291 (tender); Robbins v. Luce, [Apr.
1806] Berk. C.P. 291, affd, [Sept. 1808] Berk. SJ.C. 502 (same); Drury v. Knowles,
[uly 17851 Suff. C.P. 10 (same); Almy v. Bacon, [Apr. 18261 Bris. SJ.C. 147 (fraud or
duress); Stevenson v. Edey, [Mar. 1813] Suff. C.P. 47 (same); Holmes v. Allen, [Jan
1809] Hampd. C.P. 63 (same); Cornish v. Allen, [Sept. 1794] Berk. C.P. 81 (same);
Hooper v. Putnam, [Apr. 1785] Essex C.P. 17 (performance of conditions of bond); Poor
v. Downer, [June 1786] Essex SJ.C. 242 (justification for defamation); Cunningham v.
Barnes, [uly 1787] Suff. C.P. 122, appeal dismissed, [Feb. 1788] Suff. SJ.C. 335
(justification for assault). But see Dawes v. Gooch, 8 Mass. 488 (1812). Another rule
which survived was that a defendant could not plead parol evidence which varied a
written contract, nor could he put such evidence in under the general issue. See Sibley v.
Brown, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 137 (1826);Jacobs v. Putnam, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 108 (1826);
Townsend v. Weld, 8 Mass. 146 (1811); Barnard v. Titcomb, [July 1790] Essex C.P. 7.
On the limits of the parol evidence rule, see generally Comstock v. Van Deusen, 22 Mass.
(5 Pick.)
163 (1827); Leland v. Stone, 10 Mass. 459 (1813).
2 40
Act of Apr. 16, 1836, ch. 273, § 2, [18361 Mass. Laws 1000.
24 1
Sampson v. Coy, 15 Mass. 493, 494 (1819); accord, Hemmenway v. Woods, 18
Mass.242(1 Pick.) 524 (1823).
See13 L. REP.481 (1851).
24 3
See 14 L. REV. &QJ.BRIT. &FOR.JUR. 143 (1851).
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tort and replevin for litigating personal actions 244 which took
their place alongside the ancient generic plea of land used in real
actions. In addition, the 1836 act, passed during the course of
earlier study of the state's law by a similarly eminent commission, 24 5 had confirmed the earlier judicial abolition of special
pleading and provided further that "all matters of law or of fact
in defence of [an] action [could] be given in evidence under the
general issue... .,246
Long before this legislation, though, the abolition of
common law pleading had begun to have consequences which
were often unforeseen and which required compensatory
modification of other rules of law. One advantage of common
law pleading is that, in addition to giving parties notice of the
essence of each other's claims, it narrows the issues that can arise
upon trial by requiring parties to select before trial, at least in
part, the legal theory they plan to pursue. Particularly if the
parties have engaged in special pleading, the issues on which
litigation will turn will be precisely identified before trial begins.
With the abolition of common law pleading, however, issues
were no longer formulated and defined before trial but during
the very course of trial, as the parties offered evidence and made
legal contentions on the basis of that evidence.
Two problems arose. One came in determining the res
judicata effect of prior judgments where facts had been put-in
issue by means other than pleadings and hence were not of
record.2 47 The other problem was that preparation for trial
became more difficult and hazardous. As one defendant argued,
the complaint to which he had to respond was "so general, that it
24 4

Act of May 22, 1851, ch. 233, 9 1, [1851] Mass. Laws 698. The 1851 Law was
repealed in 1852 and was replaced by Act of May 22, 1852, ch. 312, § 1, [1852] Mass.
Laws 223, which retained the 1851 reforms and added certain other reforms as well. For a
discussion
of the additions in the 1852 law, see 15 L. REP. 112 (1853).
24
5SeeJ. STORY, A Report ofthe Commissioners Appointed to Consider and Report Upon the
Practicabilityand Expediency of Reducing to a Written and Systematic Code the Common Law of
Massachusetts, or Any Part Thereof in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OFJOSEPH STORY 698,
728 (W. Story ed. 1852) (Da Capo Press reprint 1972). Justice Story headed the
Commission which finally recommended not the codification of the law of pleading, but
its reduction
to a simpler form.
24 6
Act of Apr. 16, 1836, ch. 273, § 1, [1836] Mass. Laws 1000.
24 7
For cases in which the SupremeJudicial Court, in great confusion, struggled with
this question, see Parker v. Standish, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 288 (1825); Standish v. Parker,
19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 20 (1823). Its problem was that the appropriate mode for determining
the existence and scope of a prior judgment was for the court to inspect the record. See
Bellows v. Hosmer, ISept. 18201 Msex. C.P. Files, rev'd on defaul [Oct. 1820] Msex.
SJ.C. 110. But cf Hayden v. Shed, [Nov. 18141 Msex. S.J.C. 52 (jury verdict for plaintiff
in trespass for seizing property previously seized upon prior suit for same cause of
action).
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[was] impossible [that] any man [could] prepare to defend
himself in the same .... 24 8 Whereas litigants at common law had
often had to prepare evidence only upon a small number of
precisely defined issues, a litigant under the new pleading system
had to prepare to meet many potential issues, only some of which
would arise. "Causes of great importance" came, as one
commentator noted, "often to be tried by ajury merely upon the
general isssue, when the facts [were] complicated & intricate, the
evidence of great length & variety & some times contradictory,
& where questions of great nicety & difficulty [were] involved in
the discussion., 249 Moreover, a litigant faced the danger that
issues which he had never anticipated might nevertheless arise
and that he might "be surprised by a piece of evidence
which at
' 25 °
another time he could have explained or answered.
In order to ensure that parties would "not [be so] surprised
by new matter,' 251 new procedural rules had to be formulated.
Thus, the courts prohibited the admission of evidence to which
there was an objection of surprise, 252 and provided, even after a
verdict had been returned, for "a new trial, in case either party
be unfairly surprised by the other." 253 The hazards of preparing
for trial without being able to anticipate with certainty the issues
that would arise also compelled the courts to develop rules
authorizing the granting, after verdict, of a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence 254 which was material to
the issue, 255 was not merely cumulative,2 25 6 and had not remained
24 8
Kelton v. Butler, [Jan. 18011 Suff. C.P.
24 9
Howe Lectures supranote 105, at 336.
50

186.

E 1d
2
51Vining v. Whiting, (Suff. S.J.C. 1796), in Dana, supra note 97.
252
Sylvester v. Bailey, (Ply. SJ.C. 1790), in Dana, supra note 97.
2533 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *306; accord,Boston Gazette, May 13, 1782, at
1, col. 1 (quoting Blackstone). See also Taylor v. Parsons, [Dec. 1816] Essex C.P. 493;
Quirk v. Mingus, [Sept. 1810] Norf. C.P. 247; Mason v. Payson, [Mar. 1805] Msex. C.P.
11 (movants for new trials claimed surprise but were unable to make sufficient
demonstrations
thereof on the facts).
254 See Chatfield v. Lathrop, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 417 (1828); Niles v. Brackett, 15
Mass. 378 (1819); Starbuck v. Coffin, [Oct. 1825] Nan. C.P. 210. See also Bond v.
Humphrey, [July 1828] Suff. C.P. 85; Sylvester v. Wood, [Sept. 1.814] Bris. C:P. 130;
Taylor v. Stone, [Dec. 1813] Msex. C.P. Files; Paddock v. Holbrook, [Mar. 1811]
Worc. C.P. 536; Ford v. Haley, [Dec. 1808] Msex. C.P. Files; Hager v. Weston, [Dec.
1807] Msex. C.P. Files, rev'd on other grounds, [Oct. 1810] Msex. SJ.C. 91 (litigants sought
new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence but failed to make the requisite
showing therefor); Petition of Coffin, [Oct. 1805] Nan. C.P. 352 (no disposition of
application for new trial). See generally Howe Lectures, supra note 105, at 376-83.
25
2- SeeTuttle v. Cooper, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 414 (1827).
-56SeeChatfield v. Lathrop, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 417,418 (1828); Gardner v. Mitchell,
23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 114, 116 (1828).
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undiscovered through fault of the movant.2 7 Newly discovered
evidence became, in fact, "the most common cause for granting
new trials."2 58 As a general matter, new trials were granted
whenever a9 party had not had adequate opportunity to present
his claim.5
5
2 TSee Bond v. Cutler, 7 Mass. 205 (1810); Hammond v. Wadhams, 5 Mass. 353
(1809).
258
Howe Lectures, supra note 105, at 376. New trials continued to be granted for
various sorts of misconduct on the part of jurors or because juries were improperly
composed. SeeCommonwealth v. Hussey, 13 Mass. 221 (1816) (petit juror also member
of grand jury returning indictment); Knight v. Inhabitants of Freeport, 13 Mass. 218
(1816) (son-in-law of party spoke with juror); Prescott v. Spring, [Apr. 17971 Msex.
SJ.C. 45 (juror absent during part of deliberations); Commonwealth v. Cooms, [Nov.
1786] Essex SJ.C. 465 (jurors separated during deliberations); Wait v. Boston &
Roxbury Mill Corp., [Dec. 18211 Norf. C.P. 317 (juror related to plaintiff);
Commonwealth v. Godfrey, [Sept. 1821] Norf. C.P. 247 (no jury foreman chosen);
Hubbard v. Hartwell, [Feb. 18211 Berk. C.P. 418 (juror discussed case with nonjurors
prior to verdict); Youlin v. Cogswell, [Dec. 1817] Essex C.P. 543 (juror in paternity case
a resident of town in which plaintiff a pauper); White v. Bodwell, [Sept. 1805] Essex C.P.
225 (jury in road case held before deputy sheriff instead of sheriff); Saxon v. Vinall,
[Oct. 1802] Suff. C.P. 153 (jurors had out-of-court conversation prior to verdict);
Petition of Newhall, [Oct. 1806] Essex G.S. 180 (jurors improperly summoned). Cf
Highway in Cambridge, [Sept. 1803] Msex. G.S. 201 (report of road committee rejected
since a member thereof "not a disinterested freeholder, he having real estate" in town
paying for road). But see Washburn v. Inhabitants of Middleboro, [Nov. 1828] Ply. C.P.
118 (motion on ground that officer in charge of jury was an inhabitant of defendant's
town overruled); Wood v. Souther, [Mar. 18251 Msex. C.P. Files (motion on ground that
magistrate to whom complaint was made in paternity case was an inhabitant of plaintiff's
town overruled); Anthony v. Briggs, [Sept. 18201 Bris. C.P. 142 (motion on ground that
juror was a nephew of plaintiff overruled); Butterfield v. Mason, [Mar. 18201 Msex. C.P.
Files (motion on ground that juror was related to defendant overruled); Hincher v.
Howland, [Dec. 1819] Worc. C.P. 322(motion on ground that juror was absent during
evidence, argument and deliberations overruled after hearing); Batterman v. Bell, [Dec.
18121 Suff. C.P. Files (motion on ground that jurors separated during deliberations
overruled); White v. Leonard, [Apr. 1811] Norf. C.P. 119 (motion on ground that jurors
in paternity case were residents of plaintiff's town overruled); Petition of Lovell, [Sept.
1813] Norf. G.S. 258 (motion on ground that juror was a proprietor in defendant
corporation overruled). Other objections to the composition of juries were valid only if
seasonably made. Compare Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. (10 Pick.) 477, 479-80
(1830) (name of juror not in jury box), and Inhabitants of Amherst v. Inhabitants of
Hadley, 18 Mass. (I Pick.) 38 (1832) (juror's name drawn more than 20 days before
court sitting), with Commonwealth v. Knapp, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 496, 498-99 (1830)
(discussion of propriety of challenges for cause on basis of juror's prior knowledge from
newsgapers about facts of criminal case).
For other such rules not discussed in the text, see Dunham v. Baxter, 4 Mass. 79
(1808) (new trial granted when defendant prevented by court's ruling from presenting
relevant evidence); Leadbetter v. Lovewell, [Sept. 1823] Msex. C.P. Files (new trial
granted when defendant suddenly taken seriously ill and therefore unable to attend
court); Patten v. Richardson, [Dec. 1821] Norf. C.P. 308 (new trial granted when
judgment on default entered by "mistake and accident"); Hall v. Walker, [Jan. 18191
Berk. C.P. 318 (new trial granted when attorney of out-of-state defendant forgot return
date of writ); Brooks v. Davis, [Nov. 1813] Worc. C.P. 404 (new trial granted when
defendant ill and failed to attend court in belief that nominal party in interest would
answer); Brown v. Keith, [June 1813] Worc. C.P. 7 (new trial granted to non-resident
who had no knowledge of suit); Petition of Gilbert, [May 17921 Hampd. C.P. 93 (new
trial granted when defendant did not know of suit). Cf Highway in Cambridge, [Nov.
17931 Msex. G.S. 134 (decision on report of road committee postponed when party
"unexpectedly deprived of an opportunity of shewing his reasons against the acceptance"
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CONCLUSION

The unforeseen consequences of the abolition of common
law pleading indicate most clearly, perhaps, what was at stake in
the nineteenth century movement toward pleading reform and
why that reform could not take place overnight as the reformers
of the 1780's demanded, and the students of the Field Code
thought it did. Although common law pleading was antiquated,
unduly technical and expensive, and hence in need of reform, it
nonetheless provided a working system for the trial of cases.
More important, it provided lawyers with a conceptual framework within which to analyze an otherwise amorphous body of
legal rules. Thus, although lawyers in Massachusetts at an early
date recognized that the rules of pleading were in need of reform
and began to take hesitant steps in that direction, full reform
could not occur until new substantive categories for analyzing
the law and new procedures for ensuring the fair dispensation of
justice were developed. The new modes of thought and the new
forms of procedure emerged only slowly; the Massachusetts
statutory procedural reforms came not as sudden bursts of
creative endeavor but as ratifications of a half century of gradual
evolution.26 0 The slow transformation of common law pleading
in Massachusetts suggests that the widely held image of the Field
Code as a stroke of reforming genius must be reexamined.
thereof). But see Brown v. Bigelow, [Dec. 1823] Worc. C.P. 358 (new trial denied when
defendant unable to write plea because of lack of attorney); Jewett v. Lane, [June 1818]

Worc. C.P. 607 (new trial denied when bad roads prevented timely arrival of out-of-state
litigant); Petition of Chase, [June 1813] Essex C.P. 437 (new trial denied upon claim that
original trial held so quickly that defendant lacked opportunity to prepare); Richardson
v. Truman, [Oct. 1807] Suff. C.P. Files (new trial denied to defendant when plaintiff,
after putting documents in evidence, failed to give copies to defendant to permit
rebuttal); Inhabitants of Worcester v. Allen, [Mar. 1825] Worc. G.S. 360 (new trial
denied when agent of defendant failed to make arguments which defendant had ordered
him 26
to make).
°Reform in England, however, does appear to have come rather suddenly and
largely as a result of legislation beginning in 1852. Seenote 2 supra. English procedural
reform seems to have come about largely through American influence, as is evidenced by
the attention paid by English legal journals to American procedural reforms of the
mid-19th century. See 14 [N.S.] L. MAG. 1 (1851); 12 L. REV. & QJ. BRIT. & FOR.JUR.
366 (1850); 13 L. REV. & QJ. BRIT.& FOR.JUR. 65 (1850), 213 (1851); 14 L. REV. & Oj.
BRIT. & FOR.JUR. 143,284 (1851); 17 L. REV. & QJ. BRIT. & FOR.JUR. 217,225 (1852);
18 L. REV. & QJ. BRIT. & FOR.JuR. 217, 426 (1853); 22 L. REV. & QJ. BRIT. & FOR.
JUR. 317 (1855).

